Rahi Naik
Introduction: Why the Gulf Is Building Security Beyond Washington
For decades, the security architecture of the Arabian Gulf rested on an implicit bargain: Gulf monarchies would remain closely aligned with Washington, while the United States would provide the military deterrence necessary to protect the region’s territorial integrity, energy infrastructure and maritime routes.
That bargain has not collapsed. But it has been tested.
The 2026 war involving the United States, Israel and Iran exposed a difficult reality for America’s Gulf partners. Washington remains the region’s most capable external military power, and American forces continue to provide capabilities that Saudi Arabia and its neighbours cannot easily replicate. Yet the conflict also demonstrated that American protection does not necessarily mean American control over the trajectory of a conflict—or immunity from its consequences. The regional escalation brought Iranian missile fire onto Gulf oil exporters and intensified doubts about the sufficiency of the long-standing U.S. security umbrella. [1]
For Saudi Arabia in particular, this distinction matters. Riyadh did not seek a war that could threaten its energy infrastructure, shipping routes and economic diversification programme. Yet once conflict with Iran escalated, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states had to absorb the consequences of a confrontation whose strategic objectives were not entirely theirs.
This helps explain why the Gulf’s response cannot be understood simply as an anti-Iran alignment or an ideological shift toward Israel. It is better understood as strategic hedging.
The Gulf is therefore not abandoning the American security umbrella. It is building a roof underneath it.
1. The Gulf’s Fundamental Problem: It Cannot Afford Instability
The contemporary Gulf economy is built around a contradiction. Its wealth has historically depended on hydrocarbons, but its future economic strategy increasingly depends on openness.
Saudi Arabia’s diversification agenda seeks to attract foreign investment, develop tourism, expand logistics and manufacturing, build technological capabilities and establish the Kingdom as a major global economic hub. These ambitions require something that military power alone cannot guarantee: stability.
A missile strike against an oil installation is therefore not merely a military event. A disruption to a shipping lane is not merely a maritime-security problem. A perceived increase in the probability of conflict is not merely a diplomatic concern. Each can become an economic liability.
The Red Sea crisis demonstrated this mechanism clearly. Attacks on commercial shipping around Bab el-Mandeb encouraged major shipping companies to avoid the Suez route and reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. UNCTAD found that the diversion added about 12 days to a Shanghai–Rotterdam voyage, increased operating costs and cut effective global container-shipping capacity by around 9 percent. [2]
The same vulnerability is even more consequential around the Strait of Hormuz. In 2024, oil flows through the strait averaged about 20 million barrels per day—roughly 20 percent of global petroleum-liquids consumption. The EIA estimates that only about 2.6 million barrels per day of unused Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity could be available to bypass the strait during a disruption. [3]
For Gulf governments, the strategic conclusion is unavoidable: a military threat to the region can become an economic threat long before it becomes an existential military defeat.
An economy designed to become a global logistics, finance and tourism hub cannot afford to be perceived as a permanent theatre of war.
Figure 1. Arabian Peninsula maritime chokepoints
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
2. Iran: The Threat the Gulf Cannot Ignore
The Gulf states do not all perceive Iran in exactly the same way, and their relations with Tehran have never been uniformly hostile. Saudi Arabia itself pursued diplomatic rapprochement with Iran before the current conflict.
But diplomacy does not eliminate the underlying security dilemma.
Iran possesses substantial ballistic-missile and drone capabilities and maintains relationships with armed non-state actors across the region. The ability of Iran and its partners to threaten energy infrastructure, shipping and military installations means that Gulf states cannot simply treat the Iranian question as an ideological dispute between rival political camps.
For Saudi Arabia, the problem is especially acute because its economic ambitions make it highly sensitive to disruption.
Riyadh may therefore prefer de-escalation with Iran while simultaneously preparing for the possibility that deterrence fails. Diplomacy reduces the probability of conflict; deterrence raises the cost of initiating conflict. A state that wants stability therefore needs both.
This helps explain why Gulf governments can simultaneously pursue dialogue with Tehran, maintain relations with Washington, engage Israel on selected issues, and develop new defence partnerships with Türkiye and Pakistan.
The objective is not necessarily to choose one camp. It is to ensure that no single failure leaves them strategically exposed.
3. The U.S. Security Umbrella: Not a Failure, but No Longer Sufficient
It would be analytically lazy to conclude that the American security umbrella has simply failed. It has not.
The United States still possesses unmatched capabilities in the region: advanced air and missile defence; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; naval power; long-range strike capabilities; logistical infrastructure; military bases and personnel; and the ability to project force at a scale that no regional actor currently matches.
The problem is different. Gulf states cannot assume that American military power will always be employed according to their preferred strategic timetable. Reuters’ reporting on the Makkah agreement described the pact as emerging amid questions in Saudi Arabia over the reliability of the long-standing U.S. security umbrella after years of regional conflict threatened oil exports and development plans. [1]
The 2026 Iran war exposed this distinction. Gulf states shared serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities and support for armed actors across the region. But supporting the objective of constraining Iran does not mean welcoming every consequence of escalation.
For Riyadh, war placed its economic and territorial security at risk while the decision to escalate was fundamentally an American and Israeli one. This creates a profound strategic lesson: dependence on an ally does not necessarily mean dependence on that ally’s judgement.
The Gulf therefore has an incentive to retain the United States while simultaneously developing additional security options. That is hedging, not abandonment.
4. Why Normalization With Israel Entered the Equation
It is tempting to interpret Saudi-Israel normalization simply as an ideological breakthrough. The strategic logic is broader.
Israel possesses capabilities directly relevant to the Gulf security problem, particularly in missile defence, intelligence, surveillance, cyber capabilities and advanced military technology. For Gulf states facing Iran, selective cooperation with Israel can therefore offer practical security benefits.
For Washington, Saudi-Israel normalization could help consolidate a broader regional architecture in which Israel and key Arab states cooperate against common threats while remaining connected to the United States.
But normalization carries a political cost. Saudi Arabia has not normalized relations with Israel, and the Palestinian question remains central to Riyadh’s public conditions for any such step. The result is a strategic paradox: Saudi Arabia can see the security value of selective cooperation with Israel while simultaneously having reasons not to become strategically dependent on it.
If Iran is eventually weakened, contained or brought into a new regional settlement, the immediate strategic justification for some forms of Saudi-Israeli convergence could change. Saudi Arabia therefore has an incentive to avoid constructing a security architecture that makes it dependent upon either Washington or Tel Aviv.
5. The Makkah Agreement: Building a Second Layer of Deterrence
On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. The agreement stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against all three and provides for enhanced defence cooperation. [4]
The agreement is therefore more than a military arrangement. It is a hedging mechanism.
Saudi Arabia is effectively adding another layer to its security architecture:
United States → external military power
Saudi Arabia–Türkiye–Pakistan → regional collective deterrence
Bilateral partnerships → specialised capabilities
Diplomacy with Iran → conflict-management mechanism
These layers are not mutually exclusive. The Makkah agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to abandon Washington. It allows Riyadh to develop additional capacity to protect itself while retaining its most powerful external security relationship.
That distinction is central to understanding the agreement.
6. Why Türkiye and Pakistan?
The composition of the agreement is itself revealing.
Saudi Arabia possesses enormous financial resources, strategic geography and a central position in Gulf energy markets. Türkiye brings a large military, an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, extensive operational experience and NATO interoperability. Pakistan brings a large military establishment, longstanding defence ties with Saudi Arabia and, uniquely among the three, a nuclear deterrent.
But this should not be reduced to the simplistic formula of Saudi money plus Turkish technology plus Pakistani manpower.
The three states already possess longstanding defence and political relationships, and the official joint statement explicitly invokes historical ties, brotherhood, Islamic solidarity, shared strategic interests and longstanding defence cooperation. [4]
That is precisely why the agreement is analytically interesting. Realpolitik has not eliminated identity. Instead, identity and strategic interest are operating together.
Identity can provide the language of foreign policy while realpolitik shapes some of its practical choices.
7. Who Should Actually Be Concerned?
The United States: Cautious, but Not Necessarily Alarmed
Washington has little reason to oppose regional partners taking greater responsibility for their own security so long as new arrangements complement rather than displace existing U.S. partnerships. The Makkah pact’s signatories have themselves stressed that it is defensive and does not replace existing alliances. [1]
From Washington’s perspective, a stronger Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security arrangement can be useful if it protects energy infrastructure, improves deterrence and reduces pressure on U.S. forces. The concern would arise if regional security cooperation began to exclude or circumvent the United States altogether. For now, the pact is better read as diversification than strategic divorce.
China: The Opportunistic Balancer
China has little incentive to choose one Middle Eastern camp outright. Its interests include protecting energy supplies, maintaining relations with Iran, preserving economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, expanding technological influence, limiting American dominance and avoiding a war that threatens commercial interests.
Beijing can therefore continue a strategy of selective engagement. It does not need a formal alliance to benefit from a regional order in which no single external power has uncontested control.
India: The Country That Cannot Ignore This
India’s position is considerably more complicated. New Delhi has invested heavily in its relationships with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf while simultaneously maintaining a consequential strategic relationship with Israel and a longstanding security rivalry with Pakistan.
The Makkah agreement therefore creates a difficult triangle. India does not need to interpret the agreement as an immediate military threat, but it cannot ignore the possibility that Pakistan’s strategic role is being extended from South Asia into West Asia.
Reuters reported that India’s Foreign Ministry said it was closely following the pact. [1] The prudent Indian approach is therefore neither alarm nor dismissal, but close attention to what the agreement becomes in practice.
The critical question is not simply what the agreement says on paper. It is whether it develops integrated command structures, joint exercises, defence-industrial cooperation, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, logistical commitments or actual operational plans. That question has become more immediate: on 31 August, the three countries convened their first committee meeting to discuss interoperability, defence capabilities and cooperation in defence technology and production. [5]
Israel: The More Complicated Concern
Israel’s calculation is perhaps even more interesting. In the immediate term, Israel and several Gulf states share concerns about Iranian military capabilities. That creates incentives for strategic convergence. But that convergence should not be mistaken for friendship.
Saudi Arabia and Israel remain politically and historically distinct actors with different visions for the regional order. If Iran remains the principal threat, the Makkah arrangement may indirectly serve Israeli interests by strengthening deterrence against Tehran. But if the regional balance changes, the calculation changes with it.
The important question for Israel is therefore not simply whether the pact is anti-Israel. It is what happens to the arrangement if Iran is no longer the principal threat. Reuters noted that the three signatories share concerns about the military postures of both Iran and Israel, while Israel declined immediate comment when the pact was signed. [1]
The signatories themselves describe the pact as defensive and not directed against a particular country. Its future strategic meaning will depend on how far its institutional and operational dimensions develop. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said on 27 August that operationalization remained at an early stage. [6]
8. The Deeper Paradox: The Gulf Is Hedging Against Everyone
The most interesting conclusion is therefore not that Saudi Arabia is abandoning America. It is not. Nor is it becoming an ally of Iran or an Israeli partner.
Instead, Saudi Arabia appears to be pursuing strategic optionality.
• Maintain the United States because American military power remains indispensable.
• Engage Israel where useful because Israeli technology and intelligence can contribute to deterrence.
• Maintain diplomatic channels with Iran because permanent war is economically disastrous.
• Build ties with Türkiye and Pakistan because regional deterrence cannot depend entirely on Washington.
• Maintain relations with China because China is economically indispensable and strategically useful.
This is not incoherence. It is hedging under conditions of uncertainty.
The more Saudi Arabia invests in becoming a global economic hub, the less willing it can be to allow its strategic future to depend on a single external security provider or a single regional equilibrium.
Conclusion: From Security Dependence to Strategic Optionality
The transformation underway in the Middle East is therefore more complicated than the familiar story of ideology giving way to realpolitik.
Ideology has not disappeared. Iran has not ceased to matter. Israel has not suddenly become a friend of the Gulf. America has not abandoned the region. China has not chosen a single camp. And the Makkah agreement is not yet a fully operational NATO equivalent.
What has changed is the cost of strategic vulnerability.
Gulf economies are now too globally integrated to treat war as an exclusively military problem. A missile can become an insurance premium. An insurance premium can become a shipping cost. A shipping cost can become an investment risk. An investment risk can undermine economic diversification. And economic vulnerability can ultimately reshape foreign policy.
This is why the Gulf is building layers of security.
The objective is not to replace America, embrace Israel, confront Iran or create an Islamic military bloc. It is to ensure that no single strategic relationship—and no single failure—can determine the region’s fate.
The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement is therefore best understood not as the birth of an “Islamic NATO,” but as a manifestation of a broader transition from security dependence toward strategic optionality.
The United States may remain the Gulf’s most powerful security partner. But Riyadh increasingly wants the ability to survive a crisis even when Washington’s priorities, timing or strategy do not perfectly align with its own.
And that is where the economics of insecurity meet the geopolitics of the new Middle East.
References
[1] Reuters. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan pledge mutual defence as Middle East turmoil escalates.” 7 August 2026.
[2] UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). “Red Sea Crisis and implications for trade facilitation in Africa.” 17 April 2024.
[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint.” 16 June 2025.
[4] Government of Pakistan, Press Information Department. “Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence.” 7 August 2026. See also the Saudi National Platform joint statement and the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications.
[5] Reuters. “Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan to hold first defence pact meeting, source says.” 30 August 2026.
[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan. “Transcript of the Press Briefing by the Spokesperson.” 27 August 2026.
About the contributor
Rahi S. Naik is a SYBA Political Science student at Kishinchand Chellaram College, HSNC University.
Acknowledgements
The author extends sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
