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Prime Minister’s Employment Generation Programme (PMEGP),2008 – IMPRI Impact And Policy Research Institute

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Prime Minister’s Employment Generation Programme (PMEGP), 2008
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source: https://hindi.mysba.in/prime-ministers-employment-generation-program-pmegp/

Introduction

The Prime Minister’s Employment Generation Programme (PMEGP) is India’s flagship credit-linked subsidy scheme for promoting micro-enterprises in the non-farm sector. Launched to expand self-employment opportunities and absorb surplus labour through entrepreneurship, PMEGP blends bank credit with government margin money (subsidy) and is implemented through Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC) at the national level and state/district agencies on the ground. This analysis reviews PMEGP’s origins, institutional design and functioning, measurable performance, emerging problems, socio-economic impact, and policy recommendations for improving its effectiveness. 

Background

PMEGP was created by merging two earlier schemes, which are Prime Minister’s Rojgar Yojana (PMRY) and Rural Employment Generation Programme (REGP), to promote self-employment through setting up micro units in manufacturing, service, and agro-processing sectors. The scheme aims to generate sustainable employment, reduce dependence on wage labour, and encourage entrepreneurship among youth and disadvantaged groups (SC/ST/women/minorities). It is a central-sector programme administered by the Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME) and operationalized through KVIC, State KVIBs, District Industries Centres (DICs), and scheduled banks. Eligibility restricts support to new projects only; existing units are not eligible for the margin money subsidy. 

How PMEGP Functions

Credit-linked subsidy model: Beneficiaries receive margin money (subsidy) ranging typically from 15% to 35% depending on category and location; banks provide the balance as term loans. Maximum project cost ceilings differ by activity (manufacturing/service). Banks disburse loans, and the margin money is placed as a Term Deposit Receipt/Subsidy Reserve Fund (TDR/SRF) for a lock-in period (usually 3 years) and adjusted against the loan afterward. KVIC is the nodal agency nationally; at the state/district level, State KVIC Directorates, State KVIBs, and District Industries Centres undertake project identification, training, and forward applications to banks for appraisal. Financing banks appraise and sanction loans under normal credit procedures while claiming margin money through the nodal mechanisms. 

The scheme prioritizes youth, women, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and special areas (e.g., parts of the North East). Applicants receive training (entrepreneurship, project preparation) and handholding from implementing agencies. The scheme also maintains an online portal for applications, sanctions, and tracking.

Performance

Official documents and annual reports show that the PMEGP program has funded many small projects and created jobs, usually a few jobs per project since these are small businesses. The Ministry’s yearly reports indicate ongoing approval and funding across different years, with significant activity in both rural and urban areas. Recent press releases from KVIC highlight continued subsidy payments and efforts to fund thousands of projects at once.

However, government audits and academic studies reveal mixed results. Audits by the CAG have pointed out issues like procedural mistakes, delays in implementation, and some cases of poor project selection related to Khadi initiatives, suggesting that governance and accountability need improvement. Academic research shows that while some beneficiaries manage to run successful small businesses and create local jobs, others face challenges with market access, repaying loans, and keeping their businesses viable.

Impact 

  • At the unit level, PMEGP creates direct self-employment (owner) and limited wage employment (usually family plus a few additional hires). Where enterprises succeed, local multiplier effects (local procurement, allied services) are observed. Official figures and NABARD/academic studies record thousands of projects and corresponding employment, but intensity per project remains low relative to public expectations. 
  • The scheme provides important access to credit and entrepreneurship opportunities for women and marginalized groups; in several states, PMEGP has been a channel for social inclusion and for starting micro-enterprises in non-farm activities. 
  • Survival rates vary. Many projects remain micro and subsistence-oriented; a smaller share grows to become stable, scalable units. Where additional support, market linkages, cluster support (e.g., SFURTI), and skill upgradation are available, outcomes are substantially better. 

Emerging Issues

  • Targeting vs. sustainability trade-off: PMEGP’s objective to maximize the number of projects (and thus immediate employment numbers) can compromise the depth of pre-project appraisal and market viability assessment. The quantity of units created does not always translate into sustainable jobs. 
  • Implementation bottlenecks and governance: CAG audits and official notes point to delays in margin money flows, procedural irregularities, poor monitoring of TDR/SRF adjustments, and gaps between project sanction and actual disbursement. District-level administrative capacity varies widely, affecting timely handholding and monitoring. 
  • Although banks sanction loans, many micro units face repayment stress due to weak cash flows and limited entrepreneurship experience, reflecting gaps in credit appraisal
  • Market access and value chain integration: Many beneficiaries are skilled in production but lack linkages to markets, inputs, bulk buyers, or branding support; the absence of systematic market intermediation limits scale-up. 
  •  Digital/operational disruptions: Portal closures or partial reopenings, reported in news outlets, create procedural uncertainty and exclusionary effects for applicants, particularly in non-priority categories. 

Way Forward

  • To strengthen PMEGP’s effectiveness as a tool for sustainable employment and entrepreneurship, the following policy actions are recommended:
  • Enhance the depth of technical and market appraisal done by DICs/KVIC before bank referral. Integrate mandatory, short incubation or BDS modules (market assessment, cash-flow planning) to improve viability and repayment capacity.
  • Digitise and audit the entire lifecycle (application → sanction → disbursement → performance) with real-time dashboards, third-party verification, and routine post-sanction impact surveys. Address CAG-identified lapses through stronger internal controls. 
  • Consider linking portions of margin money release to performance milestones (e.g., 1st year operational milestone), avoiding creation of TDRs that sit idle while business viability remains untested. This balances support with accountability. 
  • Ensure the PMEGP portal is robust, transparent, and accessible. Any closures or category-based restrictions should be rare, well-justified, and communicated with timelines to avoid applicant disenfranchisement. Recent portal disruptions underline the need for continuity protocols. 

Conclusion 

PMEGP remains a central instrument in India’s toolkit for promoting self-employment and micro-enterprise creation. Its credit-linked subsidy architecture and nationwide institutional network give it reach and potential. However, evidence from audits, academic studies, and media reporting suggests mixed outcomes: while many beneficiaries receive crucial start-up support, sustainability, scaling, governance, and market integration remain major constraints.

To enhance the effectiveness of the program and ensure its long-term sustainability, it is crucial to reorient it with a focus on several key areas. Firstly, implementing a stronger pre-sanction appraisal process is essential. This entails a thorough evaluation of potential projects before they receive funding, assessing their viability, market needs, and alignment with broader economic goals. By carefully vetting projects upfront, we can minimize the risk of failure and allocate resources to initiatives that show the most promise for success.

In addition to a robust pre-sanction appraisal, fostering cluster integration is vital. This approach involves creating networks of interconnected businesses, suppliers, and service providers within specific industries or regions. By encouraging collaboration and synergy among these entities, we can enhance efficiency, share best practices, and stimulate innovation. Such integration not only strengthens individual businesses but also contributes to a more resilient and thriving economic ecosystem as a whole.

Moreover, introducing performance-linked subsidies can significantly improve the impact of public funding. By tying financial support to specific performance metrics, we encourage beneficiaries to achieve measurable outcomes, such as job creation, productivity improvements, or technological advancements. This results-oriented approach can maximise the effectiveness of public funds, ensuring that they are used to generate tangible benefits for the economy and society.

Lastly, establishing a robust post-sanction handholding mechanism is critical for the ongoing success of funded projects. This involves providing continuous support and guidance to beneficiaries after they receive financial assistance. By offering mentorship, training, and access to resources, we can help entrepreneurs navigate challenges, adapt to changing market conditions, and ultimately transform their initiatives into sustainable enterprises. 

By concentrating on these four pillars, stronger pre-sanction appraisals, cluster integration, performance-linked subsidies, and comprehensive post-sanction support, we can significantly improve survival rates for funded projects. This strategy will not only deepen the employment impact of public investments but also ensure that taxpayer funds are utilised effectively, ultimately leading to the launch of enduring and successful enterprises that contribute positively to the economy.

References

About the Contributor: Srishti Sinha is a student of sociology at Miranda House, University of Delhi, with a keen interest in gender, cultural representation, development, public policy, and research.

Acknowledgement: The author expresses her sincere gratitude to the IMPRI team, Ms. Aasthaba Jadeja and Ms. Bhaktiba Jadeja for their invaluable guidance throughout the process.  

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