Riddhi Sutar
Background
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in its SIPRI Yearbook 2026, reported that India may have operationally deployed approximately 12 nuclear warheads for the first time during peacetime. According to SIPRI’s assessment, India possessed an estimated 190 nuclear warheads as of January 2026. Of these, 12 warheads were classified as “deployed” because they were either mounted on delivery systems or located at bases with operational forces.
Traditionally, India’s nuclear posture involved maintaining a degree of separation between nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. This practice was consistent with India’s nuclear doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence and No First Use (NFU). The reported deployment highlighted by SIPRI suggests a possible evolution in India’s operational nuclear posture rather than an officially declared change in doctrine. SIPRI noted that India’s ongoing nuclear modernisation increasingly reflects the need to maintain a credible deterrent against China.
The development of longer-range delivery systems is capable of reaching strategic targets across China. Importantly, neither the deployment estimates provided by SIPRI nor any formal changes in the nuclear doctrine have been acknowledged by the Indian government. Therefore, rather than being a formally proclaimed policy decision, the reported deployment should be interpreted as an independent evaluation by a globally recognised research institute.
Functioning
India’s Nuclear Doctrine incorporates the principles of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) and No First Use (NFU), officially articulated by the Government of India in 2003. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), headed by the Prime Minister through the Political Council, has the power to approve the use of nuclear weapons. And the operational management and execution of nuclear directives is with the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The reported increase in India’s estimated nuclear arsenal from 180 warheads in 2025 to 190 in 2026 has been interpreted by SIPRI as part of broader efforts to modernise and strengthen its deterrence posture.
India has continued to consolidate its nuclear triad, which is the capability to deliver nuclear weapons through land, air, and sea-based platforms. By lowering reliance on a single delivery platform, the creation of the nuclear trio improves the survival of India’s nuclear arsenal. A secure sea-based deterrent, in particular, strengthens India’s credible second-strike capability, ensuring the ability to retaliate even if land-based assets are compromised.
| Component | Platform | Approximate range | Strategic significance |
Land based | AGNI I | 700-900 KM | Provides short-range nuclear deterrence against regional adversaries. |
| AGNI II | 2,000 KM | Enhances regional strike capability beyond immediate neighbours. | |
| AGNI III | 3,000-3,500 KM | Enables targeting of strategic assets deeper within Chinese territory. | |
| AGNI IV | 4,000 KM | Improves accuracy, survivability, and response flexibility. | |
| AGNI V | >5,000 KM | Allows coverage of most major Chinese cities, strengthening credible deterrence. | |
Air based | MIRAGE 2000H | Classified | Considered one of India’s traditional nuclear delivery aircraft. |
| JAGUAR IS/IB | Classified | Provides flexible airborne nuclear delivery capability. | |
| RAFALE | Combat radius 1,000-1,800 KM | Widely assessed to possess potential nuclear delivery capability, though not officially designated for this role. | |
Sea based | INS ARIHANT (SSBN) | Equipped with K-15/K-4 SLBMs | India’s first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, completing the nuclear triad. |
| INS ARIGHAAT(SSBN) | Equipped with K-15/K-4 SLBMs | Enhances the survivability and continuity of sea-based deterrence patrols. | |
| K-15 SAGARIKA(SLBM) | 750 KM | Provides submarine-launched retaliatory capability against nearby adversaries. | |
| K-4 SLBM | 3,500 KM | Extends the reach ofIndia’s sea-based nuclear forces into the Indo-Pacific region. |
Table 1: India’s Nuclear Triad: Operational Capabilities and Strategic Implications
Source: Author’s compilation based on SIPRI (2026), Federation of American Scientists (2024), Press Information Bureau (2024), and MP-IDSA publications.
Note: Since many operational details of India’s strategic forces remain classified, the ranges, platform roles, and strategic assessments presented in the table are derived from open-source literature, official government releases, and expert analyses rather than official disclosures by the Government of India.
Performance
India’s strategic modernisation over the past few years increasingly reflects the need to maintain a credible deterrent against China’s expanding nuclear and military capabilities. SIPRI estimates that China’s nuclear stockpile increased from approximately 500 warheads in 2024 to 600 warheads in 2025. China is currently expanding its arsenal faster than any other nuclear-armed state.
China’s estimated arsenal is more than three times larger, creating a significant capability gap that influences India’s deterrence calculations. The development of the K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (approximately 3,500 km range) extends India’s sea-based deterrent beyond South Asia. Simultaneously, India’s operationalisation of the Agni-V ballistic missile, with a range exceeding 5,000 km, enables coverage of most major Chinese cities.
To ensure that India’s nuclear forces can survive a potential first strike and execute a retaliatory response, investments are undertaken to harden underground infrastructure. On 11 March 2024, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully conducted the testing of Mission Divyastra, involving an indigenously developed Agni-V missile equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.
MIRV systems use multiple warheads and decoys, making interception more difficult and increasing penetration against sophisticated ballistic missile defence systems in the context of China’s growing missile defence capabilities. India joined a small group of countries possessing demonstrated MIRV capability, with mission Divyastra, including the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom.
Figure 1. Satellite imagery of a fortified underground complex near Morki, India, highlighting tunnel networks and layered security features identified through open-source analysis as indicative of potential strategic storage infrastructure.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (2025), Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2025.
Figure 2. Satellite imagery of the under-construction INS Varsha near Rambilli on India’s eastern coast reveals extensive tunnelling activity, nearly 30 tunnel entrances, and the development of new piers and support infrastructure. Once completed, the facility is expected to serve as the principal homeport for India’s ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet, thereby strengthening the survivability and credibility of its sea-based nuclear deterrent.
Source: Federation of American Scientists (2025), Indian Nuclear Weapons, 2025.
Note: Both this image is based on open-source satellite imagery analysis and expert assessments. The Government of India has not publicly disclosed detailed operational aspects of the facility.
Impact
India has historically projected itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to restraint and minimum deterrence. Reports of peacetime deployment may invite closer international scrutiny regarding the future trajectory of India’s nuclear posture. However, in nuclear deterrence, perceptions matter as much as capabilities.
SIPRI’s assessment itself may serve as a form of strategic signalling, shaping how adversaries perceive India’s preparedness and resolve. The Government of India has neither confirmed these estimates nor announced any formal revision to its nuclear doctrine; the findings raise important questions about the evolving nature of deterrence in South Asia.
Emerging Issues
China’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal and technological advancements continue to reshape India’s strategic calculations and may contribute to an action-reaction dynamic in the region. Investments in advanced technologies such as MIRVs, submarine infrastructure, and long-range delivery systems require substantial financial and institutional resources.
Nuclear studies are dependent on Open-Source Assessments, as much of the current debate is based on independent estimates by organisations such as SIPRI and the Federation of American Scientists, as official data remains unavailable. While strengthening deterrence is essential for national security, excessive emphasis on readiness and capability expansion may undermine long-term regional stability.
Way forward
The Track-II dialogues and strategic exchanges involving regional experts can contribute to better threat assessment and stability. The Government of India should ensure that strategic modernisation is aligned with broader defence priorities and fiscal sustainability. Greater emphasis may be placed on indigenous research and development to reduce long-term dependence on external technologies.
Researchers and media organisations should exercise caution in interpreting open-source intelligence and clearly distinguish between official disclosures and analytical estimates. Cross-verification through multiple credible sources should be encouraged. Regional stakeholders should complement deterrence with dialogue, confidence-building measures, and adherence to responsible nuclear management.
References
- Cabinet Committee on Security. (2003, January 4). The Cabinet Committee on Security reviews the operationalisation of India’s nuclear doctrine. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=99168
- Defence Research and Development Organisation. (2024, March 11). DRDO successfully conducts a flight test of Mission Divyastra. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2013549®=48&lang=2
- Federation of American Scientists. (n.d.). Nuclear weapons publications. https://fas.org/publication-term/nuclear-weapons/page/4/
- Hindustan Times. (2024, March 12). India successfully tests Agni-5 MIRV missile with 5,000 km range: 5 key facts. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-successfully-tests-agni-5-mirv-missile-with-5-000-km-range-multi-warhead-capability-5-key-facts-101778406449213.html
- Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (n.d.). India’s nuclear doctrine. https://indianembassyusa.gov.in/ArchivesDetails?id=99
- Kristensen, H. M., Korda, M., Reynolds, E., & Johns, E. (2024). Indian nuclear weapons, 2024. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 80(5), 269–279. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2024.2388470
- Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. (n.d.). Nuclear studies and deterrence publications. https://www.idsa.in/taxonomy/term/173
- Mishra, A. (2024, March 13). India launches MIRV-capable Agni-V missile. Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/india-launches-mirv-capable-agni-v-missile/
- Press Information Bureau. (2024, August 29). Commissioning of INS Arighaat. Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2049870®=48&lang=2
- Sharma, R. (2026, June 16). India now has 12 deployed nuclear warheads for the first time: SIPRI report. Deccan Herald. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/india-now-has-12-deployed-nuclear-warheads-for-first-time-sipri-report-4033150
- SIPRI. (2026). SIPRI Yearbook 2026: Armaments, disarmament and international security (Summary edition). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/yb26_summary_en_0.pdf
- SIPRI. (2026). SIPRI databases. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/databases
- SIPRI. (2026, June 8). Increasing focus on nuclear weapons amid heightened escalation risks: New SIPRI Yearbook out now. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/increasing-focus-nuclear-weapons-amid-heightened-escalation-risks-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now
- Singh, M. (n.d.). Signs of the emerging third leg: Strengthening India’s triad. Journal of Defence Studies, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. https://idsa.in/publisher/journal-of-defence-studies/signs-of-the-emerging-third-leg-strengthening-indias-triad
About the Contributor
Riddhi Suthar is a researcher and policy enthusiast with interests in public policy, governance, international relations, maritime affairs, and strategic studies. Their work focuses on evidence-based policy analysis, geopolitical developments, and emerging global challenges, with particular attention to India’s strategic and developmental priorities. She is engaged in analytical writing, policy research, and academic discussions related to governance, security, and international affairs.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement
The author extends sincere thanks to the IMPRI team for their guidance.
She also extends her sincere thanks to Shruti Sethi and Simona Miriam Highes for their valuable feedback, useful suggestions, and support in shaping this article.
This article was posted by Yashkirti Pal, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI.
