Policy Update
Mehul Rastogi
Background
PRAHAAR is India’s first formal comprehensive counter terrorism policy to move the country from a largely reactive response to a coordinated, intelligence‑led, whole-of-government posture. ‘PRAHAAR’ was finalised and launched in February 2026 by the Ministry of Home Affairs after accelerating the policy work in 2024-2025 in response to high-profile counter-terrorism operations. Nowadays, modern terror networks no longer depend solely on weapons and physical training; they increasingly exploit narcotics trafficking, digital platforms, financial opacity, and covert state sponsorship to finance and expand their operations. Therefore, ‘PRAHAAR’ is a multi-layered strategy, which is built on ‘Zero Tolerance’ and prevention of terrorism through digital intelligence structures, law enforcement and international relations.
The policy is precisely divided into seven pillars –
- Prevention of terror attacks
- Response
- Aggregating capacities
- Human Rights and ‘Rule of Law’ based processes
- Attenuating the conditions conducive for terrorism
- Aligning and shaping International efforts
- Recovery and resilience through a whole-of-society approach
Although India has had its fair share of counter-terrorism policies, from Terrorist and Disruptive (Prevention) Activities (TADA) to Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). It can be argued that this is the first comprehensive policy introduced by India.
Functioning
India has been a primary target of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Violent extremists have used the latest technologies to hatch conspiracies and conduct drone strikes in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. The policy was launched, consolidating seven pillars to enable India to prepare against violent extremists.
Prevention of Terror Attacks – This section primarily focuses on countering terrorist threats through an ‘intelligence-guided’ approach. The procedure will be anchored by the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) under the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to capture real-time inputs on Counter-Terrorism (CT). These inputs will be shared across the country to Central Agencies and State Police Forces under the mechanism of MAC/JTFI in IB. Law enforcement actively dismantles Over Ground Worker (OGW) Modules and counters the misuse of the internet by Violent Extremists through proactive disruptment of Cyber activities and online networks used for the recruitment of Jihad.
Response – To any Terrorist attack, the local police will be the first to respond, followed by specialised State and Central anti-terror Forces. For major attacks, the National Security Guard (NSG) is the national Counter-Terror force under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), assisting State forces. Responding to a terror attack is a multi-stakeholder exercise involving various Agencies at the Central, State and District levels. But for Apex-level threats, there exists a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which is also issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The state forces are also simultaneously assisted by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to ensure high prosecution rates, aiming to establish a robust legal deterrent against future terror threats.
Aggregating Capacities – Modernising and standardising of modules and advanced weaponry is critically important for CT Responses. The Bureau of Police Research & Development (BPR&D) regularly organises training courses for the personnel of State Police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), and in acquiring the latest tools, technology and weaponry. While this section specifically highlights the modernisation of modules and weaponry, there remains a capacity asymmetry. Local and state police often lack funding for cyber-training and advanced infrastructure, which is necessary to tackle drone threats and immediate attacks.
Human Rights and Rule of Law-Based Processes – Laws like The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and various other acts are in place to adhere to the ‘Rule of Law’ India follows. This gives a wide scope for the Supreme Court of India to ensure that the citizens are rightly protected and properly represented to get affordable legal services.
The reason the acts TADA and POTA were publicly disliked was because it had a wide subjective scope to detain individuals under the pretext of extreme radicalisation. The ‘PRAHAAR’ document also does not clearly specify on what basis an individual is measured as radicalised.
Attenuating the conditions conducive to Terrorism – Indian youths are constantly targeted by terrorist groups through different mediums and online platforms. The groups have also circulated a list of “private messaging applications” which they think is ‘secure’ according to them
To prevent the youth from getting radicalised, once identified, these youths undergo a graded police response, aimed at comprehensively addressing the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism in a multi-stakeholder setting. Various individuals engage to spread awareness about the impacts of radicalisation like religious leaders, moderate preachers and NGOs.
This section also fails to specify two very important problems. Firstly, what procedures and rehabilitation do the young individuals go through when identified as radicalised and what level is termed as radicalisation among the youth.
Aligning and Shaping the International Affairs – To strengthen the voice against terrorism, an international level of cooperation is required with neighbouring countries and through International Forums. India has entered into various agreements/arrangements like Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), Extradition Treaty/Extradition Arrangement (ET/EA), Joint Working Group (JWG) and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with foreign partners for information/evidence sharing and other legal cooperation.
SAARC and BIMSTEC security dialogues focus on cross‑border terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and intelligence sharing alongside bilateral dialogues like the Homeland Security Dialogue with the US and Joint Security Committees with Israel and UAE.
Recovery and Resilience through a whole-of-society approach – It is based on a strong public-private partnership to facilitate rapid restoration and long-term community strength. The policy aims to restore normalcy swiftly and build long-term psychological and physical resilience against terror-induced disruption.
Performance
It is relatively difficult to evaluate the performance of “PRAHAAR’ with its launch in February, 2026. The analysis is divided into precursor signals (2023–25) and early implementation (2025–26). Budgetary allocations have had a decisive effect on PRAHAAR’s early functioning. The Union Budgets of 2024–25 and 2025–26 channelled substantial resources into CAPFs modernisation and ₹10,000 crore in 2025–26. At the same time, NATGRID expansion and cyber‑forensics received smaller but significant allocations of ₹3,500 crore and ₹2,500 crore, respectively. The Economic Survey’s note that internal security expenditure rose to 0.4% of GDP underscores heightened prioritisation.
Functionally, this funding profile has strengthened India’s capacity for large‑scale, kinetic response, like better-equipped CAPFs, improved mobility, and enhanced rapid‑reaction capabilities. At the same time, the relative under‑investment in forensic, National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) integration, and specialised cyber capabilities constrains the prevention and attribution layers that are very important for disrupting the tech‑enabled and trans‑national plots before they mature.
A critical challenge faced in the functioning is the uneven absorption of funds for modernisation across states. Some states like Punjab, Maharashtra, and Karnataka have absorbed over 80% of allocations, states like Bihar and Jharkhand lag below 50%. This disparity has direct operational consequences: first‑responder readiness is geographically uneven, and districts in low‑absorption states remain dependent on slower mobilisation of central assets.
Impact
To understand ‘PRAHAAR’s impact, we must understand if it has – reduced the incidence and severity of terrorist incidents, improved the speed and effectiveness of disruption and prosecution, strengthened hands with the international communities.
PRAHAAR has institutionalised the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), which acts as a secured network linking district police to central agencies. This structural change has increased the number of actionable leads and improved central‑to‑state handovers, enabling faster disruption where state nodes and forensic pipelines are functional. MAC action as a network has already reported to have increased alerts from 800 in 2023 to 1200 in 2025, signalling better detection and readiness for Counter-Terrorism strategies. This proves an improvement in the speed of detection for incidents and disruption.
Operational Deterrence and Operation Sindhoor
Operation Sindhoor was immediately triggered after the terror attack in Pahalgam’s Baisaran Valley in Jammu and Kashmir. Operation Sindhoor can be considered as the clearest manifestation of ‘PRAHAAR’s Intent, being a coordinated, precision campaign that combined intelligence, tri‑service strike capability, and pre‑cleared mobilisation of national assets. It reshaped perceptions of India’s posture against terrorism, signalling a readiness to act with firmness when national security is at stake.
International Alignment and Trans-National Effects
Through PRAHAAR’s international dimension, India has increased engagement in multiple multilateral forums, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-RATS). India first assumed the presidency of the SCO in 2023 through rotating chairmanship and held the first India-China Bilateral consultations in April in New Delhi. Embedding PRAHAAR in these diplomatic and legal linkages increases its reach against cross‑border financing and logistics networks, but effectiveness depends on reciprocal cooperation and mutual legal assistance. India has Mutual Legal Assistance (MLATs) treaties with over 40 countries. This enables India to obtain evidence and information abroad and request the extradition of suspects.
Emerging Issues
Human rights and subjectivity in De-radicalisation – India has previously released anti-terrorism policies like TADA and POTA, which have received public dissatisfaction due to their vague definition of radicalisation. Measuring radicalisation is inherently psychological and subjective; lacking clear legal benchmarks could lead to inconsistent application, arbitrary profiling, or localised grievances.
When these laws are implemented against individuals, there is a lack of accountability permeating the government and security forces, creating an atmosphere in which human rights violations can often go unpunished. The US State Department report mentions that the Security force officials who committed human rights abuses generally enjoyed de facto impunity. To avoid these issues, having a clearer understanding of how the government assess radicalisation would be a good start. This would help in reducing the cases where the innocents are held up, creating unsatisfactory complaints from the public.
Uneven state absorption of modernisation and technological capacities – Some states have rapidly fielded anti‑drone systems and forensic upgrades, while others lag, creating geographic pockets and increasing dependence on the central. The local police also lack the funding for advanced infrastructure and cyber training, which are usually the responders to a terrorist attack. To assess this issue, enhancing the State and UT Counter-Terrorism Units and Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS) with uniform structures, modern resources, advanced training, and standardised investigation methods would prove a good measure.
International Cooperation Conditionalities – ‘PRAHAAR’ is interdependent on the reciprocal of MLAT/MLA. Their responsiveness and willingness to act on the intelligence, because of geopolitical frictions, can delay or block critical actions.
Way Forward
‘PRAHAAR’ is a milestone in having a safer India for all of us with a better strategy for Counter-Terrorism. It aims to criminalise all terrorist acts and deny access to funds, weapons and safe havens to the terrorists, their financiers and supporters. However, there remains scope for a more thorough structure to be built in place. For their next phase, there is a need for building Counter-terrorism units of states to respond and neutralise incidents. There is also a requirement for legal experts for every stage of investigation, right from registration of FIR to its culmination in prosecution.
This could prove to be a decisive change by changing the focus from a ‘national’ led Counter terrorism to a “state’ and ‘local CO. Embedding a capable authority closer to the point of incidence will shorten response times and improve evidence preservation ensuring that the first responder like the district police and local security units are both empowered and equipped to act decisively. A state‑anchored approach does not dilute national strategy rather, it wil operationalises PRAHAAR’s doctrine by making its SOPs, intelligence flows, and forensic pipelines actionable where incidents actually occur.
References
Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026. Government of India.
The Week, 2026. Decoding ‘PRAHAAR’ anti-terror policy: How India’s 7-pillar plan aims disrupt terror networks. The Week.
Decoding ‘PRAHAAR’ anti-terror policy: How India’s 7-pillar plan aims disrupt terror networks- The Week
The Hindu, 2026. India unveils first anti-terror policy PRAHAAR, addressing cyber threats. The Hindu.
Hindustan Times, 2026. Centre unveils seven-pronged Prahaar counter-terror policy. Hindustan Times.
The Hans India, 2026. ‘PRAHAAR’: India’s newest weapon against terrorism. The Hans India.
The Hans India Report, 2026. Operation Sindoor marked decisive shift in India’s anti-terror doctrine. The Hans India.
Observer Research Foundation, 2026. PRAHAAR: India’s New Counter-Terror Policy in a Hybrid Threat Era. ORF.
SPRF, 2026. From TADA to PRAHAAR: Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy in India. SPRF.
Policy Brief, 2024. Terrorists on Telegram_022024.pdf. Independent Research Publication.
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/2024-02/Terrorists%20on%20Telegram_022024.pdf
Drishti IAS, 2026. National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy: PRAHAAR. Drishti IAS.
Liberation, 2008. UPR Submission: India. OHCHR.
About the Contributor
Mehul is currently working as a Research and Editorial Intern, graduated with a degree in Liberal Arts and a specialisation in Economics, and a minor in political science. His work has basically revolved around Developmental Economics and Labour Economics. Interested and motivated to pursue research in International affairs and strategic studies.
Acknowledgement
The author extends his sincere gratitude to Shivani Chauhan, Lubina Dua, and the IMPRI team for their invaluable guidance throughout the process.
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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