Upal Mitra
The foreign policy of India presents an extraordinary shift in its foreign policy course, where it was on a non-alignment path during the Cold War and now it is on a strategic autonomy path in the twenty-first century influenced by the multi polarity. Non-alignment was first envisaged by Nehru as a moral and political stance of opposition to bipolarity, with the aim of preserving sovereignty and participating in superpower confrontation space (Acharya, 2014).
Since the post-Cold War world, the Indian diplomacy has become more pragmatic and autonomy-seeking, stressing on issue-driven coalitions as opposed to hard-ideological non alignment (Mohan, 2006). Modern literature refers to this as multi-alignment, whereby India is trying to balance itself with competing actors, the United States, Russia and China, thereby increasing their strategic options (Pant & Joshi, 2016; Hall, 2016).
The non-alignment is a living tenet, not a fossil, and this is done through the Indo-Pacific policy of India, membership in Interpol-like groupings like BRICS, SCO as well as the G20 and the balancing act so between great powers. It is a responsive philosophy of independence and equipoise, opposes the great-power dependence and pursues national interests.
Such transformation is hypothetically detained in the frames of realistic concern with powers, constructivist attention to identities, and postcolonial IR criticism of hegemonic arrangements. The much-considered question is whether non-alignment has become multi- alignment in India or is this a practical extension of the strategic autonomy experienced in Nehruvian precedence. The evidence also indicates continuity with adaptation as opposed to break (Tharoor, 2012).
Introduction
The Non-Alignment doctrine as was developed by Jawaharlal Nehru in early Cold War was a moral and strategic answer to the unchangeable bipolarity of the times (Acharya, 2014).
Though, it was anchored in the desire to have sovereignty and autonomy, it also indicated the opposition of India being enticed into big-power wrangles. Nonetheless, the foreign policy of India has tended in recent years to shift between continuity and adaptation-being less ideologically neutral to more pragmatic autonomous since the onset of the post-Cold War era (Hall, 2016; Mohan, 2006).
This contradiction between Nehruvian legacies and present demands is still in place as India becomes a rising economy in a multipolar world, where new multilateral institutions like BRICS, SCO, and G20 reorient world governance (Pant & Joshi, 2016; Tharoor, 2012). The paper below will chart this transformation and question whether non-alignment has become multi-alignment or continues as strategic autonomy.
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
The theoretical reasoning behind the foreign policy of India in the 21 st century is the recasting of the classical Indian school of thought Non-Alignment as a strategy of Strategic Autonomy translates into as independence of both dial-making and decision in the multipolar world order (Acharya, 2014; Mohan, 2006). Instead of dismissing the involvement of great powers, India also applies Multi-Alignment, diversifying relationships with its competitive powers like the United States, Russia, and China, to ensure that it has maximum available options (Pant & Joshi, 2016; Hall, 2016).
The theoretical scaffolding is three fold In understanding Realist terms, India policies represent a politics of centrist-liberalism, or said more directly, balancing the politics of power in opposing the risk by proliferating relations (Mohan, 2006). The policy of Constructivism through the remodeling of foreign policy is based on the civilizational self- image of India and India as a leader in Global South (Tharoor, 2012). Lastly, Postcolonial thoughts on IR view non-alignment as a longstanding trend of challenging the dominance and affirming their autonomy within global governance (Acharya, 2014).
So, non-alignment in the 21st century is a force of adaptation not a return to neutrality and it combines the pragmatism of realism with the politics of identity of constructivism and the normative challenge of power hierarchies presented by post colonialism.
Literature Review
The academic discourse over the foreign policy course of India can be characterized by a shift and counter shift between the heritage of Nehruvian non-alignment and its consequent realist adjustments in the 21 st century. Chalachagnacharya (2014) on India places its strategic orientation as a state that tries to cope with the great power conflict in a post-
American system. Mohan (2006) highlights the shift out of ideological neutrality and presents the Indian diplomacy as that of a pragmatist-based neutralism bearing on a power-balancing approach, in lieu of moral idealism. Hall (2016) extends this idea in as much as he argues that the period of Modi has seen the emergence of multi-alignment in that India develops parallel relationships with opposing powers to increase latitude.
This evaluation is supported by Pant and Joshi (2016) who point to the aggressive state of foreign policy conducted by Modi that elevates the pride of sovereignty and self-confidence over the classic measured stance.
Tharoor (2012), on his part, however highlights India idealist desire of being in the core center of the global governance, where non-alignment is both its legacy and current ambition. Coupling these voices, the literature swings between continuity with Nehruvianism and a de- Nehruvianised realism resulting in the possibility that strategic autonomy is not a fixed doctrine but a fluid adaptation (Acharya, 2014; Mohan, 2006; Hall, 2016; Pant & Joshi, 2016; Tharoor, 2012).
Historical Evolution of Non Alignment
The origins of the Indian approach to international relations are located in a particular brand of Nehruvian idealism during the Bandung Conference (1955) and the concomitant birth of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Non-alignment was conceived as a moral and political form of independence between the two poles of the Cold War: a form of at-a-distance altruism (Acharya, 2014).
Although officially keeping the NAM, Indira Gandhi adjusted towards the Soviet Union as a response to the changing threats within the region, consequently, redefining non-alignment as something more practical and based only on interests (Mohan, 2006).
Since the end of the Cold War, the principle has been altered even further, as India adopted an economic liberalisation policy in 1991 and started to pursue rapprochement with the United States, which was a significant shift toward ideologically-neutral pragmatic autonomy (Hall, 2016). This has been a trajectory of non-alignment where it has never remained a fixed, but it has continuously readapted to changing structures as the concept has now evolved to become a broader doctrine of strategic autonomy in the 21st century (Pant & Joshi, 2016).
Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century
A pragmatic non-alignment of India The strategic autonomy is the reconsideration of the historical non-alignment of India in the light of the 21 st century. India shares strategic convergence to the Indo Pacific as well as the QUAD but is cautious not to be part of an alliance formula, another indicator of its unwillingness to forego policy autonomy (Mohan, 2006).
Russia continues to be a traditional defense ally, and New Delhi pursues a policy of balancing the relationship as Moscow shows inclination towards Beijing, thus, indicating a long track-record of diversified security alliances maintained by India (Hall, 2016). The China challenge is a more complicated affair, with strategic confrontation in the Himalaya and the Indo-Pacific, but against the backdrop of intense interdependence. In this regard,
Indo-Pacific posturing of India aims at striking the right balance in maritime security interests without compromising sovereign flexibility. At the multilateral plane, association like BRICS, the SCO, and the G20, offer platforms whereby India is placed as a voice of the Global South that confirms its role as a negotiator between great powers and emerging economies (Acharya, 2014). Such a tendency indicates that strategic autonomy is not primarily concerned with strict mutually beneficial neutrality and more with flexible issue-based coalitions that serve the national interest best (Pant & Joshi, 2016). In a multipolar world, non-alignment is therefore operationalised in the Indian foreign policy as pragmatic flexibility instead of doctrinal rigidity as continuity embraces change.
Key Debates: Multi Alignment vs Non Alignment 2.0
The most central debates in the Indian politics of foreign policy centre around the question of whether it is engaging in multi-alignment or Non-Alignment 2.0. The former, according to Hall (2016) and Pant & Joshi (2016), is an indication of how India chose to work with the competing blocs-the United States via Quad, Russia through defense ties and China through economic interdependence. Such multi-vector diplomacy indicates a demonstration of flexibility yet there is the danger of overstretch and entanglement.
On the other hand, the focus on sovereignty and strategic resilience, as well as independence in decision-making, would be in line with independent agency long pursued by India (Mohan, 2006; Acharya, 2014). The main question, at a stake, is whether India is approaching all powers or staying independent of all nature. As Tharoor (2012) argues, the solution to this lies in the fact that as a multipolar world India seeks centrality whereby, multi-alignment and strategic autonomy have been fused as the tools of state craft.
Implications for Global South and World Order
The foreign policy of India has a lot of implications on the Global South today. By labelling itself as the voice of the developing countries, India becomes a promoter on the South-South agenda in the sphere of trade, climate change negotiations, and development aid, furthering its argument to claim management out of the mainstream groups of influence (Tharoor, 2012). Reconceptualizing non-alignment as a counter-hegemonic philosophy, a normative framework that can be used to deal with the emerging great-power rivalry between United States and China is then offered (Acharya, 2014).
At the same time, the Indian approach to strategic autonomy is an illustration of how small powers may exercise sovereignty and robustness without paying the price of dependency (Mohan, 2006; Hall, 2016). Therefore, the importance of India as a new actor of multipolarity is that its developing doctrine has alternative trajectories through which the Global South can embrace global governance (Pant & Joshi, 2016).
Conclusion
Non-alignment has not yet become irrelevant as it has metamorphosed into the matter of strategic autonomy that informs the Indian foreign policy in the 21 st century. What was once the moral and strategic answer of Nehru to bipolar order in the Cold War now comes out as pragmatic balancing exercise in the multipolarity (Acharya, 2014; Mohan, 2006).
The examples of India in its external interaction manifest themselves in the consistency of principle–maintenance of independence of decision–while being flexible in practice through floating coalitions like BRICS, SCO, and Indo-Pacific formats (Hall, 2016; Pant & Joshi, 2016). The main question is whether India will be able to maintain its independence in the face of brewing hostilities between the U.S. and China or become linked into a full-scale incorporation. In the end, the relevancy of the non-alignment is not in its inability to evolve as a conceptual construction due to its origins in the Cold War but its capacity to become a counter-hegemonic ideology that can be applied to power disparities today (Tharoor, 2012).
References
- Acharya, A. (2014). The End of American World Order. Polity Press.
- Hall, I. (2016). Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi. The Round Table, 105(3), 271–286.
- Mohan, C. R. (2006). India and the Balance of Power. Foreign Affairs, 85(4), 17–32.
- Pant, H. V., & Joshi, Y. (2016). Indian Foreign Policy: The Modi Era. Bloomsbury.
- Tharoor, S. (2012). Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-First Century. Penguin.
About the contributor: Upal Mitra a 3rd year undergraduate student at Jadavpur University West Bengal,Kolkata. He is a fellow of DFPGYF Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Geopolitics Youth Fellowship- Cohort 2.0.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement: This article was posted by Shivashish Narayan, a visiting researcher at IMPRI.
