Policy Update
Debjani Chatterjee
Background
West Bengal introduced the Karma Sathi Prakalpa in September 2020 to address the problem of youth unemployment and limited access to finance for starting small businesses. Although the state had existing self employment schemes, many young people continued to face difficulties in obtaining affordable bank loans and turning their skills and ideas into sustainable livelihoods. Recognising this gap, the government introduced the scheme to support unemployed youth in both rural and urban areas. It aimed to provide soft loans and subsidies of up to ₹2 lakh for new business ventures in manufacturing, services and trading. The main objective was to encourage entrepreneurship, promote self reliance and create further employment opportunities.
Functioning
• Institutional architecture: The scheme was implemented by the Department of MSME and Textiles, with the Director of MSME as the state level nodal officer and Additional District Magistrates handling MSME matters as district nodal officers. District steering committees reviewed applications and monitored progress.
• Funding mechanism: Projects up to ₹2 lakh received a soft loan from the State owned Cooperative Bank. The government provided 15% project subsidy up to ₹25,000 and interest subsidy for up to three years.
• Beneficiaries: Unemployed youth registered with the Employment Bank were eligible to start new manufacturing, service or trading activities.
• Implementation: Applicants could apply online through the Karma Sathi portal or submit physical applications. Banks were required to process applications within a fortnight and record reasons for rejection.
• Monitoring and stakeholders: MSME officials, district committees, cooperative banks and beneficiaries formed the core implementation network, with monthly progress reporting and portal based monitoring.
Performance
• Early beneficiary coverage: Karma Sathi Prakalpa targeted one lakh unemployed youth. By November 2020, 656 beneficiaries had been reported, equivalent to approximately 0.66% of the stated target. This is an early implementation snapshot rather than a final assessment of the scheme’s overall coverage (PRS Legislative Research, 2020).
| Financial year | Amount |
| 2024–25 Actual | ₹0.75 lakh |
| 2025–26 (Budget Estimate) | ₹1.50 lakh |
| 2025–26 (Revised Estimate) | ₹0.08 lakh |
| 2026–27 (Budget Estimate) | ₹2 crore |
• Loan disbursement: By November 2020, ₹9.82 crore had reportedly been disbursed to 656 beneficiaries. The West Bengal Budget Speech 2022 separately reported that ₹7.95 crore had been distributed to 458 beneficiaries up to December 2021. Since these are separate reporting snapshots, they should not be directly interpreted as a decline in cumulative coverage without clarification of the underlying data (PRS Legislative Research, 2020; Government of West Bengal, 2022).
• Financial assistance structure: The scheme was designed to support unemployed youth seeking to establish small enterprises in manufacturing, services and trading. Its loan and subsidy framework aimed to reduce the initial financial barrier to self employment. However, the number of loans disbursed does not by itself establish whether beneficiaries successfully established viable businesses.
| Performance indicatorGovernment provisionProgressAnnual beneficiary coverage1 lakh youth656 beneficiaries by November 2020Financial assistanceUp to ₹2 lakh per beneficiary₹9.82 crore disbursed by November 2020Entrepreneurship promotionManufacturing, services and tradeMultiple enterprise categories supported through the scheme designEmployment generationSelf employment for unemployed youthComparable verified job creation figures not established from the cited records |
• Enterprise development: The scheme’s intended contribution was to help beneficiaries move from unemployment towards income generating activities. Nevertheless, the government figures cited above do not establish how many supported enterprises remained operational, increased their turnover or generated additional jobs. These outcomes are necessary for assessing whether access to credit translated into sustainable self employment.
• Budgetary position: The West Bengal Finance Department’s 2026–27 Detailed Demands for Grants records actual expenditure of ₹75,000 for 2024–25, a budget estimate of ₹1.50 lakh and revised estimate of ₹8,000 for 2025–26, and a budget estimate of ₹2 crore for 2026–27 under a Karma Sathi Prakalpa entry. These figures should be presented with their respective accounting classifications and must not be treated as evidence of actual expenditure for 2026–27 (Government of West Bengal, 2026).
• Overall assessment: Available government records demonstrate that Karma Sathi Prakalpa facilitated access to institutional credit for a section of unemployed youth. However, the available figures are insufficient to establish its long term contribution to enterprise survival, income growth and employment generation. A stronger evaluation would require district wise beneficiary data and follow up information on business continuity, repayment, turnover and jobs created.
Impact
• Access to institutional credit: Karmasathi Prakalpa created an entry point for young entrepreneurs who often faced difficulty in accessing formal finance for small businesses. By December 2021, 458 beneficiaries had received loans amounting to ₹7.95 crore under the scheme (Government of West Bengal, 2022). This indicates that the scheme had moved beyond financial assistance on paper and enabled a section of applicants to access institutional credit.
• Support for new income generating activities: The scheme was designed to support new activities in manufacturing, services and trading through loans and government subsidy. Its assistance structure reduced the initial financial requirement for beneficiaries by combining bank credit with a project subsidy of 15 percent of project cost, subject to a maximum of ₹25,000. For eligible categories, the required contribution could be as low as 5 percent of project cost (Government of West Bengal, 2020). This lowered the entry barrier for starting a small enterprise.
• Reduction in borrowing cost: Interest subsidy was another important channel through which the scheme reduced the financial burden on entrepreneurs. Beneficiaries making timely repayments were eligible for reimbursement of 50 percent of the interest paid for up to three years, while other eligible cases could receive 40 percent interest support (Government of West Bengal, 2020). This made formal borrowing relatively more affordable during the initial years of a business.
• Rural and urban enterprise support: The scheme was applicable to entrepreneurs in both rural and urban areas. Applications from rural areas were processed through Block Development Offices, while applicants in municipal areas could apply through Sub Divisional Offices or Kolkata Municipal Corporation. This institutional structure allowed the programme to reach potential entrepreneurs outside major urban centres (Government of West Bengal, 2020).
• Contribution to self employment: The available government data confirms that the scheme provided direct financial support to 458 beneficiaries by December 2021. However, the published government figures do not provide a consolidated estimate of the number of enterprises that remained operational or the total number of jobs created. Therefore, the impact on long term employment generation cannot be quantified from available official data.
• Continued fiscal recognition: The 2025 Budget documents reported a revised estimate of ₹1.20 lakh for 2024–25 and a budget estimate of ₹0.20 lakh for 2025–26 under one accounting head. The 2026 Budget documents recorded actual expenditure of ₹0.75 lakh for 2024–25, a budget estimate of ₹1.50 lakh for 2025–26, and a revised estimate of ₹0.08 lakh for the same year under another accounting head. These figures should be interpreted cautiously, as they relate to different accounting heads and do not, by themselves, establish the scheme’s overall impact on employment generation or enterprise sustainability.
• Transition towards broader credit support: The limited scale of Karmasathi was followed by the introduction of the Bhabishyat Credit Card Scheme, which superseded Karmasathi and expanded the maximum loan amount to ₹5 lakh with collateral free credit and subsidy support. This transition suggests that the state moved towards a broader credit based framework for young entrepreneurs (Government of West Bengal, 2025). Overall, Karmasathi’s measurable impact was strongest in improving initial access to subsidised institutional credit, while evidence on sustained enterprise growth and employment creation remains limited.
Emerging Issues
• Limited scale of the original scheme: Karmasathi Prakalpa was designed to improve access to institutional credit for unemployed youth, but its scale remained relatively limited compared with the size of West Bengal’s potential micro enterprise base. The official budget shows only ₹1.20 lakh revised expenditure for 2024 to 25 and ₹20,000 budgeted for 2025 to 26, indicating a very small continuing fiscal footprint (Government of West Bengal, 2025).
| Indicator | Government reported figure |
| Targeted unemployed youth | 1,00,000 |
| Reported beneficiaries by November 2020 | 656 |
| Early target coverage | Approximately 0.66% |
• Transition to a broader credit framework: A major emerging issue is that Karmasathi was eventually subsumed into the Bhabishyat Credit Card Scheme from 1 April 2023. Pending Karmasathi applications could be migrated with the applicant’s consent, while already sanctioned cases continued under the old scheme (MSME and Textiles Department, Government of West Bengal). This creates a need to clearly distinguish the outcomes of Karmasathi from those of its successor scheme.
• Comparatively smaller financial support: The original Karmasathi framework provided a relatively modest level of assistance for starting an enterprise. The successor Bhabishyat Credit Card scheme increased the maximum loan to ₹5 lakh, with collateral free credit and a subsidised interest rate of 4 percent. This indicates that the earlier financial ceiling may not have been sufficient for enterprises requiring larger initial investment.
• Credit access versus actual enterprise survival: Providing credit does not automatically ensure that a micro enterprise becomes financially sustainable. A key policy gap is the limited availability of publicly reported longitudinal data on whether Karmasathi supported enterprises remained operational, increased turnover or created additional employment. Without such outcome indicators, assessment can remain concentrated on sanction and disbursement rather than enterprise performance.
• Bank level implementation: Since credit is routed through institutional lenders, the final outcome depends not only on scheme eligibility but also on bank appraisal, documentation and credit processing. This makes coordination between the government and banks important. The newer credit card framework therefore introduced formal monitoring arrangements and a specific identification mechanism for scheme loans in bank systems.
• Need for stronger handholding: Access to finance alone may not address problems related to business planning, market access, accounting, digital payments and regulatory compliance. The Government’s later Shilper Samadhane initiative reflects this broader requirement by combining credit, skilling and schematic handholding for entrepreneurs. The programme targeted sponsorship of at least 2 lakh Bhabishyat Credit Card applications to banks and support for Udyam registration and other business services.
• Last mile access remains important: Entrepreneurship support has to reach potential entrepreneurs outside major urban centres. Government implementation mechanisms have therefore increasingly emphasised rural and urban coverage together. Shilper Samadhane reported 3,88,829 footfalls and 1,53,554 applications, with 1,20,478 services delivered during its reported camp period, showing both demand for government support and the importance of physical outreach.
• Measurement of employment outcomes: Employment generation is one of the central objectives of entrepreneurship schemes, but the publicly available Karmasathi data does not provide a comprehensive measure of jobs created, enterprise survival or changes in beneficiary income. Future monitoring therefore needs to move from counting beneficiaries and loans towards tracking enterprise survival, employment, repayment, turnover and income over time.
• Convergence with the wider MSME ecosystem: The emergence of Bhabishyat Credit Card and Shilper Samadhane shows that entrepreneurship policy in West Bengal is increasingly moving towards a wider ecosystem involving credit, registration, skilling, market access and administrative support. The key challenge is to ensure that Karmasathi type credit support does not operate as an isolated subsidy programme but becomes part of a continuous enterprise development pathway.
Way Forward
• Create a clear transition and tracking system: Since Karmasathi Prakalpa has been superseded by the Bhabishyat Credit Card Scheme, the government should maintain a separate record of Karmasathi beneficiaries and migrated applications. This will make it easier to assess what happened to earlier beneficiaries instead of combining their outcomes with those of the newer scheme.(West Bengal Government)
• Move from loan distribution to enterprise outcomes: Monitoring should not stop at the number of applications, sanctions and disbursements. The government should track whether enterprises are still operating after one, two and three years, their annual turnover, repayment status, additional workers employed and whether beneficiaries continue to depend on other government support. A simple annual outcome dashboard at district level would make the programme much more useful for policy evaluation.
• Strengthen pre loan business preparation: Many first time entrepreneurs need help before approaching a bank. District Industries Centres can provide a short compulsory orientation covering project costing, pricing, cash flow, bookkeeping, GST requirements, digital payments and basic market assessment. This is more practical than providing credit without sufficient preparation.
• Make bank coordination time bound: Delays between application, verification and loan sanction can reduce the usefulness of credit for a new business. A fixed timeline should be introduced for each stage, with applications that remain pending beyond the prescribed period automatically flagged to the district nodal authority. The existing government approach of facilitating credit through Bhabishyat Credit Card and Shilper Samadhane can provide the institutional base for this system.(West Bengal Government Portal)
• Build stronger post loan handholding: Credit should be followed by at least one year of business support. District level officials, MSME facilitation centres and trained local organisations can conduct periodic follow ups on repayment, procurement, registration, digital accounting and market access. This would address problems that emerge after the loan is actually received.
• Improve market linkage: Finance alone cannot ensure enterprise survival. Beneficiaries should be connected with GeM registration, local government procurement, district fairs, exhibitions and suitable MSME marketing channels. The existing Shilper Samadhane platform already includes services such as GeM registration, Udyam registration and support for credit related issues, which can be integrated with beneficiary support. (West Bengal Government Portal)
• Use district specific enterprise planning: The same business model will not work equally well across West Bengal. District administrations should identify locally viable activities based on existing skills, raw materials, market demand and infrastructure. This would make credit allocation more closely connected with actual local economic opportunities rather than treating all beneficiaries in the same way.
• Give greater attention to women and disadvantaged entrepreneurs: Future entrepreneurship support should actively identify women, SC, ST, OBC, minority and differently abled applicants who have viable business proposals but limited access to formal finance. Outreach through Bangla Sahayata Kendras and district level camps can reduce information and application barriers. The state already uses such service points for Karmasathi and other MSME schemes.
• Introduce a simple public performance dashboard: Finally, the government should publish district wise data on applications received, loans sanctioned, amount disbursed, subsidy released, repayment status, enterprises surviving after one and three years and employment generated. Such reporting would shift the evaluation of youth entrepreneurship schemes from how much money was distributed to what happened after the money was distributed.
References and Links
- Government of West Bengal, Department of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises and Textiles. (n.d.). Karmasathi Prakalpa. https://www.msme.wb.gov.in/karmasathi
- Government of West Bengal, Department of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises and Textiles. (2023, March 29). Notification: West Bengal Bhabishyat Credit Card Scheme.
- Government of West Bengal, Finance Department. (2025). Revenue expenditure: Detailed account, Major Head 2851 2025_bp13.pdf
- Government of West Bengal, Department of MSME and Textiles. (2026). Shilper Samadhane. MSME & T Department
- Government of West Bengal. (n.d.). Services: Bangla Sahayata Kendra. Services | Bangla Sahayata Kendra
About the Contributor
Debjani Chatterjee is a policy researcher with a background in Finance and Political science. Her work focuses on leveraging data analytics to support evidence based policy research.
Acknowledgement
My sincere thanks to the Impact and Policy Research Institute (IMPRI) for the opportunity to prepare this policy update article. IMPRI’s dedication to connecting research with actionable policy practice provides an invaluable platform for learning.
Reviewed by Lahari and Prisha Sachdeva
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this article are strictly those of the author and do not reflect the official position or views of the organization.


















