Policy Update
Madhur Thapar
Background
India and Japan have found common cause at sea as the Indo-Pacific becomes the world’s strategic center. For Japan, the sea lanes through the Malacca Strait are its economic lifeline. For India, security across the Indian Ocean is necessary for trade and energy. Shinzo Abe’s call in 2007 to see the Indian and Pacific Oceans as one space gave this partnership its vision, while India’s SAGAR doctrine and Modi’s Shangri-La speech set out its practical shape. Together, they laid the ground for real cooperation in keeping the region open and secure.
Over the years, this cooperation has moved from speeches to substance. Naval exercises, supply chain initiatives, and shared work in regional forums now anchor the relationship. What began as a strategic idea has turned into a working partnership, with both countries signaling that the Indo-Pacific’s stability depends on their ability to act together.
Source: Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1938774
Functioning
Over the past few years, India and Japan have progressively formalized their maritime cooperation. With engagement in naval drills to boost confidence, to complex network of bilateral and multinational agreements, the Navies of both the countries have collaborated in several ways:
Joint naval exercises: The Japan-India Maritime exercise (JIMEX) was first held in 2012. Since then, it has become a regular complex drill, which features advanced anti-submarine warfare, surface gunnery, and interoperability practice. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Indian Navy use JIMEX to test combined operations, demonstrating practical coordination. Japan also participated in Exercise Malabar, a high profile naval drill, originally involving India and the United States, but expanded to include Japan in 2015 and Australia in 2020. Malabar showcases Quad cooperation in the maritime domain and signals alignment on freedom of navigation and countering coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific.
Coast Guard collaboration: India and Japan’s coast guards meet annually and conduct joint drills. For instance, in January 2024, the Indian and Japanese coast guards carried out “Sahyog Kaijin” off Chennai to practice pollution response, rescue and boarding operations. This builds on a 2006 India-Japad coast guards MOC. In the new development, a tri-lateral US, Japan and India coast guard exercise is scheduled for Tokyo Bay in January 2025,focusing on search-and-rescue and hazardous material response. Such events enhance law-enforcement interoperability and maritime law enforcement assistance in the region.
Dialogue mechanisms: India and Japan use institutional channels to coordinate. These include yearly summit meetings, the bilateral 2+2 Defence and Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, NSA-level talks, and working groups on equipment and logistics. They have also signed multiple formal agreements: a 2015 Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DE&T) Agreement, a 2021 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for logistic support, and in May 2025 the “Japan–India Defence Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific” framework was established to oversee joint initiatives. Through these forums, the partners plan exercises, share intelligence, and align positions on maritime issues
Maritime Domain Awareness: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a strong pillar in the maritime relationship of both the countries. In 2019, India and Japan signed a maritime information exchange agreement which allowed both sides to share white-shipping data, enhancing situational awareness against piracy, trafficking, and intrusions. India’s Information Fusion Centre- Indian Ocean region (IFC-IOR) is a crucial hub for cooperation as Japanese liaison officers are posted there to improve intelligence exchange.
Performance
The performance of India–Japan maritime security cooperation can be measured in terms of its operational effectiveness, strategic alignment, and ability to shape regional order. Over the past decade, the partnership has delivered some tangible successes, but it also reveals limitations when compared to the scale of regional challenges.
On the operational front, naval interoperability has visibly improved. Exercises such as JIMEX now include complex maneuvers like anti-submarine warfare and cross-deck helicopter operations. Both sides have demonstrated an ability to conduct joint surface and aerial missions, something that was not possible in the early 2000s. This progress suggests that the navies can increasingly act as a cohesive unit in real-world contingencies.
At the strategic level, Japan’s inclusion in Exercise Malabar has been a major success. It not only upgraded the drill to a Quad-level naval platform but also showed Japan’s willingness to play a more active security role beyond its traditional focus on home defense. Malabar’s trilateral and later quadrilateral format has strengthened India–Japan cooperation by embedding it within a larger Indo-Pacific framework.
The relations between the two countries have steadily expanded, these expansions have created a platform to achieve shared security objectives. A journal article by Japan Forward states that the creation of the new Indo Pacific Defence framework and defence industrial ties are signs of “ unprecedented high technology military collaboration”.
That said, the performance of the partnership is not without shortcomings. Despite high-profile exercises and agreements, defense trade between the two countries has been minimal. Japan’s arms export restrictions and India’s slow procurement processes have meant that landmark deals, such as India’s interest in Japan’s US-2 amphibious aircraft, have stalled.
Impact
The impact of India-Japan Maritime cooperation has been most visible in regional security dynamics, multilateral frameworks, and the economic stability of the Indo Pacific. While the relationship is still evolving, the partnership has already shifted the balance of maritime engagement in the region.
At the regional level, India and Japan cooperation has become a counterweight to China’s expanding naval presence. Beijing, maturation of the South China Sea, and its growing footprint in the Indian Ocean through projects like Gwadar port and Hambanota have raised alarm in both Tokyo and New Delhi. Through regular joint exercises and a strengthened naval presence, Indian and Japan have signaled their opposition to unilateral attempts at altering the status quo. This has contributed to what scholars describe as a “soft balancing” strategy, where middle powers coordinate to constrain larger drivers without forming alliances.
A second key impact has been the strengthening of the Quad framework:Japan’s long-standing alliance with the US and India’s increasing partnership with Australia. Have a loud maritime cooperation to act as a binding element of the Quad. Naval exercises like Malabar showcase the alignment, and the Quad’s focus on freedom of navigation stems directly from the operational habits built through India-Japan ties.
Beyond security, the partnership has also influenced the economic dimension of maritime order. Both India and Japan depend heavily on sea lines of communication. For energy and rate. Japan imports nearly 90% of its oil through the Indian Ocean, while India’s own trade style is closely related to East Asia. Coordinated petrol, information, sharing, and infrastructure project projects like the Asia Africa Growth Corridor are meant to ensure safe and open sea lanes.
On the institutional front, the partnership has strengthened multilateral maritime bodies. Japan’s participation in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and India’s engagement with Japan, regional capacity building have enhanced the legitimacy of rule based maritime governance. However, impact remains asymmetrical. While Japan brings advanced technology and financial resources, India contributes geography and naval presence in the Indian Ocean. This complementary role has created more visibility for both, but it also means that cooperation is very limited and not yet expanded into hard commitments, such as mutual defence treaties. The impact is therefore more normative and strategic than tactical at this stage.
Challenges
Despite the steady progress in India-Japan maritime security cooperation, several structural and strategic challenges limit the expansion of the partnership.
One major issue is the asymmetry in capabilities. Japan has highly advanced naval technology, including Aegis- equipped, destroyers, and high tech surveillance systems, while India is still modernising its naval fleet. This imbalance makes India more dependent on Japan for technology transfer and capacity building, and can lead to tensions if expectations are not aligned with each other.
A second challenge lies in the differences in strategic culture. Japan is bound by its pacifist constitution. It has historically adopted a defensive posture, whereas India maintains “strategic autonomy” and is more reluctant to enter binding alliances. These differences make cooperation more liquid and political rather than solid and military. Although, in the recent months, India has shown strong resolve when it comes to alliances and preserving self-interest.
Another problem is the China factor. While both India and Japan see China as a competitor, their approach in dealing with China is different. Japan, which has closed ties with the United States often takes a more confrontational stance while India due to its territorial disputes and economic ties with China, adopts some more cautious and balancing strategy. This mismatch sometimes constraints the degree of alignment in their maritime responses.
Lastly, there are institutional overlaps. Both India and Japan participate in multiple multilateral forums like ASEAN, IORA and the QUAD,but coordination across these are uneven at times. Without alignment of agendas, the impact of the efforts is limited.
Way forward
The coming decade will decide whether India and Japan’s maritime partnership remains symbolic or grows into something truly transformative. To move in the right direction, four priorities stand out.
From drills to real missions: Joint naval exercises like JIMEX and Malabar have built trust, but the real test lies beyond rehearsals. If the two navies begin coordinating patrols, joining hands in disaster relief, or working side by side against piracy, the partnership will start to carry real weight.
Playing a bigger role in regional forums: Neither country can shape the Indo-Pacific order alone. By working actively within ASEAN-led groups, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, or the Quad, India and Japan can show that their vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific is inclusive and rules-based, not an exclusive club.
Matching ambition with capability and leadership: For India, this means pushing naval modernization forward. For Japan, it means following through on its decision to increase defense spending. Together, they can also help smaller Indo-Pacific states with coast guard training and maritime awareness. But none of this will matter without steady political leadership. Regular summits and 2+2 dialogues need to continue sending the message that this partnership is not just consistent, but committed for the long run.
References
Indian Navy. (2024, June 11). Japan–India Maritime Exercise – 24 (JIMEX-24) commenced at Yokosuka, Japan. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2024261
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan. (2008, October). Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html
Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India. (2025, June 2). India and Japan agrees to deepen maritime relations. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2133323
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India. (2025, August). Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between India and Japan. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/40065
Borah, U. (2024, December). India–Japan maritime partnership: A vision for connectivity, security, and resilience [Issue Brief]. Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). https://cenjows.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Dr_Ulupi_Borah_Issue_Brief_Dec_2024_CENJOWS.pdf
Observer Research Foundation (ORF). (n.d.). Japan’s Indo-Pacific security cooperation with India, Indonesia, and Australia. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japan-s-indo-pacific-security-cooperation-with-india-indonesia-and-australia
East Asia Forum. (2021, May 24). The Quad and Indo-Pacific maritime order.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/24/the-quad-and-indo-pacific-maritime-order/
Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India. (2018, December 22). Raksha Mantri inaugurates Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR).https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1557074
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan. (2008). The strategy of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000406631.pdf
About the contributor: Madhur Thapar is a Research Intern at IMPRI. She is currently pursuing her undergraduate degree in Political Science from Kamala Nehru college, Delhi university. Her research interest include public policy, international relations and psychology
Acknowledgement: The author sincerely thanks Aasthaba Jadeja and other IMPRI fellows for their valuable contribution.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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