Policy Update
Sudeshna Dutta
Background
The contemporary geopolitical architecture of Asia is defined by a fundamental spatial and strategic reorientation: the transformation of the Indian Ocean from a quiet “backyard” of regional navies into an interconnected, contested Indo-Pacific maritime theatre. For decades, New Delhi approached the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through a traditional primary-zone lens, relying on geographic proximity and naval dominance to secure key sea lines of communication (SLOCs). However, the rise of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the rapid expansion of non-traditional security threats, from Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing to maritime grey-zone coercion and the economic centrality of trans-oceanic trade have dismantled this localized geographic buffer.
Within this structural shift, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), historically restricted to tactical naval reconnaissance, coastal surveillance, and track-and-target functions, has undergone a systemic functional evolution. MDA has moved from a strictly operational naval function to a core instrument of statecraft and soft-power maritime diplomacy. Modern maritime domain awareness is no longer merely about detecting physical vessels in territorial waters; it serves as a platform for coalition-building, norm projection, and asymmetric capacity-building among littoral states.
To address vulnerabilities without constructing a formal military alliance, the Quad leaders launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) at the 2022 Tokyo Summit (White House, 2022). The initiative was expanded at the 2024 Wilmington Summit and reinforced during the 2026 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024; U.S. Embassy in India, 2026).
For India, IPMDA serves as a cornerstone of its maritime security diplomacy. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), launched at the 2022 Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo, serves as a non-military, technology-driven data-sharing initiative designed to provide near-real-time maritime intelligence across the Indo-Pacific region. It integrates New Delhi’s national security policies, specifically the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision introduced in 2015 and the MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across the Region) doctrine, with Quad-wide surveillance networks (Ministry of External Affairs, 2025). This framework allows India to act as a “net security provider” across the IOR while preserving its strategic autonomy and non-alignment posture.
Functioning
The IPMDA operates as a decentralized, non-classified maritime domain awareness (MDA) framework designed to synthesize real-time commercial data and distribute an integrated Common Operating Picture (COP) to littoral states across the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands.
1. Data Aggregation Architecture
Rather than relying on classified military radar feeds, IPMDA uses commercial space-based technology:
- Radio Frequency (RF) Sensing & Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): Collects signals from commercial satellites (e.g., HawkEye 360) to track vessels that turn off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders (“dark shipping”).
- Commercial Electro-Optical Imagery: Provides high-resolution satellite imagery to verify vessel locations and identify illegal fishing operations.
2. Regional Integration Hubs
Data collected via IPMDA is routed through four existing regional fusion centers:
- Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR): Hosted by the Indian Navy at Gurugram, India (launched in December 2018), serving as the primary hub for the Indian Ocean (Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2018).
- Information Fusion Centre (IFC): Located in Singapore, focusing on Southeast Asian sea lanes.
- Pacific Fusion Centre (PFC): Located in Port Vila, Vanuatu, covering South Pacific island nations.
- Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (RMIFC): Based in Madagascar, monitoring the Western Indian Ocean.
3. Division of Labour Among Quad Partners
| Quad Member Country | Primary Technology & Platform Contribution | Key Institutional / Funding Role | Primary Geographic Focus Area |
| India | IFC-IOR data fusion; Coastal Radar Chain network; P-8I Poseidon patrol aircraft; Hydrographic survey assets. | Hosts International Liaison Officers (ILOs); funds domestic coastal radar expansion (Ministry of Defence, 2023). | Indian Ocean Region (IOR), South Asia, choke points (Malacca, 6°/8° Channels). |
| United States | Commercial space-based RF sensing; Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR); advanced AI analytics software. | Primary funding for commercial satellite feeds; analytics integration (White House, 2024). | Pacific Ocean, South China Sea, global data integration layer. |
| Japan | Satellite optical imagery; patrol vessel transfers; maritime civil infrastructure loans. | Funding for civil maritime capacity building and radar hardware via JICA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2023). | East China Sea, ASEAN sea lanes, vital shipping routes. |
| Australia | Aerial surveillance (P-8A Poseidon); intelligence fusion infrastructure; Pacific Maritime Security Program. | Primary financial/administrative sponsor of the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu (Department of Defence, Australia, 2023). | South Pacific island states, Southern Ocean, Eastern IOR approaches. |
Performance
The performance of IPMDA and India’s maritime surveillance diplomacy can be evaluated across several operational and technical metrics:
1. Domain Coverage and Track Monitoring
- Track Volume: According to Indian Navy annual operational statistics, the IFC-IOR monitors vessel tracks annually across the Indian Ocean, processing real-time White Shipping inputs from partner nations and regional maritime security centers.
- Partner Outreach: As confirmed in the 2024 Quad Leaders’ Summit Fact Sheet, the IPMDA framework has provided dark-vessel tracking data to over two dozen countries across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands (White House, 2024).
2. Institutional Integration at IFC-IOR
- International Liaison Officers (ILOs): India’s IFC-IOR hosts embedded International Liaison Officers from over 12 partner nations, including the United States, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives, and Mauritius (Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 2023).
- National Command Control Communication and Intelligence (NC3I) Network: Links 46 coastal radar stations along India’s mainland and island territories (Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshadweep) directly to the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) in Gurugram.
3. Bilateral Operational Enablers
India’s performance within IPMDA is reinforced by foundational defense agreements signed with the United States:
- LEMOA (2016): Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement allows reciprocal refueling and replenishment for maritime patrol aircraft and naval vessels.
- COMCASA (2018): Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement enables secure, real-time encrypted communication between Indian and US maritime surveillance platforms (e.g., P-8I and P-8A aircraft).
- BECA (2020): Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement facilitates sharing high-precision geospatial data and satellite mapping for navigational accuracy.
Impact
The implementation of IPMDA under India’s Quad framework has reshaped the Indo-Pacific maritime security environment:
- Capacity Enhancement for Small Island Developing States (SIDS): SIDS across the IOR and Pacific often lack long-range naval or aerial assets. IPMDA provides these nations with cost-effective, near-real-time satellite tracking data, helping them monitor their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and detect foreign distant-water fishing fleets operating without authorization (White House, 2024).
- Validation of India’s Strategic Autonomy: By focusing on unclassified, commercial, and civilian-oriented applications (e.g., tracking IUU fishing and supporting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief [HADR]), India avoids the military-alliance connotations of the Quad. This non-military posture allows New Delhi to cooperate closely with Western allies while preserving its multi-aligned foreign policy and maintaining strategic relationships with non-Western powers like Russia.
- Strategic Balance and Maritime Transparency: IPMDA brings greater transparency to grey-zone activities in the Indian Ocean. By making dark-shipping data accessible to regional governments, the initiative limits secretive maritime activities, including unannounced hydrographic survey operations and covert ship-to-ship transfers, without precipitating direct military confrontation.
- Institutional Reinforcement via MAITRI & Observer Missions: At the 2024 Wilmington Summit, the Quad expanded IPMDA’s operational footprint by launching the MAITRI (Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific) initiative, with India hosting the inaugural workshop in 2025 and establishing the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission to improve cross-decking and interoperability among member coast guards (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024).
Emerging Issues
Despite operational successes, several strategic, technical, and structural challenges affect the IPMDA framework:
- The Operational Enforcement Gap: IPMDA excels at generating alerts for dark ships and IUU fishing vessels. However, many littoral recipient states lack the physical patrol craft, aviation fuel, and naval personnel required to intercept and enforce laws against offending vessels once identified. Consequently, surveillance data does not consistently lead to interdiction.
- Dependence on Foreign Commercial Technology: India relies significantly on foreign commercial space-based RF sensing platforms and advanced AI analytical processing software funded primarily by the United States. This technological dependence creates operational vulnerabilities if commercial subscriptions or foreign access policies change.
- Data Classification and Sovereignty Concerns: India maintains a strict distinction between unclassified commercial White Shipping data shared via IPMDA and classified military tracking data gathered by the Indian Navy. Managing these security protocols across a multi-nation network requires constant administrative oversight.
- Domestic Bureaucratic Fragmentation: Intra-national coordination gaps persist between the Indian Navy, the Indian Coast Guard, state marine police forces, and civilian port authorities, slowing down national-level data integration and response times (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2021).
- Geopolitical Balancing in the IOR: Small IOR littoral states (e.g., Sri Lanka, Maldives) often attempt to balance relationships between India, the Quad, and China. Political transitions in these countries can lead to shifts in their willingness to host radar nodes, receive Quad surveillance feeds, or restrict foreign research vessel port calls.
Way Forward
To convert IPMDA from an information-sharing network into an effective maritime enforcement ecosystem, India, the Quad, and regional partner nations should focus on four key areas:
1. Establish Standardized Multi-Tiered Data Protocols
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) should collaborate with Quad counterparts to formalize a three-tiered data classification standard:
- Tier 1 (Public/Unclassified): Open-source AIS and basic commercial RF satellite feeds shared freely with all littoral states for HADR and IUU tracking.
- Tier 2 (Restricted Partner Data): Correlated dark-vessel analytics shared bilaterally with vetted coastal law enforcement agencies.
- Tier 3 (Classified Operational Tracks): Encrypted, real-time tactical military data restricted to Quad defense forces via COMCASA/BECA infrastructure.
2. Pair Surveillance Data with Enforcement Capacity Building
Rather than distributing data in isolation, the Quad, led by India in the IOR through the MAITRI initiative, should bundle IPMDA data access with physical enforcement support. This includes transferring decommissioned patrol craft, providing fuel subsidies, and delivering maritime law enforcement training to smaller littoral states.
3. Invest in Sovereign Space-Based Sensing Systems
India should direct the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and domestic defense-technology firms to deploy a dedicated constellation of low-Earth orbit (LEO) micro-satellites equipped with spaceborne RF receivers and Synthetic Aperture Radar. This will reduce long-term reliance on foreign commercial software vendors and establish sovereign processing capabilities at the IFC-IOR.
4. Expand the IFC-IOR International Liaison Network
India should expand the International Liaison Officer (ILO) program at the Gurugram IFC-IOR by inviting additional liaison officers from East African littoral states (e.g., Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique) and ASEAN countries. Broadening representation will reinforce the IFC-IOR’s role as the central information node for the wider Indian Ocean.
References
Comptroller and Auditor General of India. (2021). Performance audit on coastal security scheme (Report No. 14 of 2021). Union Government (Defence Services), Government of India. https://cag.gov.in
Department of Defence, Australia. (2023). Defence strategic review 2023. Commonwealth of Australia. https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review
Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2015). Ensuring secure seas: Indian maritime security strategy. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy). https://www.indiannavy.nic.in
Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2018, December 22). Inauguration of Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) [Press release]. Press Information Bureau. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1557022
Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2022). Annual report 2021–2022. Government of India. https://www.mod.gov.in
Ministry of Defence, Government of India. (2023). Annual report 2022–2023. Government of India. https://www.mod.gov.in
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2024, September 22). Fact sheet: Quad leaders’ summit 2024. Press Information Bureau. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseDetail.aspx?PRID=2057460
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2025, March 12). Evolution from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: Strengthening maritime governance in the Indian Ocean [Press release]. Press Information Bureau. https://www.pib.gov.in
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2023). Japan’s national security strategy. Government of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000571.html
U.S. Embassy in India. (2026, May 27). Factsheet: 2026 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi. U.S. Department of State. https://in.usembassy.gov/factsheet-2026-quad-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-new-delhi/
White House. (2022, May 24). Fact sheet: Quad leaders’ Tokyo summit 2022. Executive Office of the President. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/
White House. (2024, September 21). Fact sheet: The 2024 Quad leaders’ summit. Executive Office of the President. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/09/21/fact-sheet-the-2024-quad-leaders-summit/
About the Author
Sudeshna Dutta is a second-year B.A. (Hons.) History student at Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. She is a Research & Editorial Intern at IMPRI (Impact and Policy Research Institute). Her academic and policy interests lie at the intersection of law & public policy, geoeconomics and history.
Acknowledgement
The author sincerely thanks the IMPRI team for their guidance and support throughout the preparation of this Policy Update. The author also acknowledges the valuable feedback and constructive suggestions provided by the reviewers, which helped improve the clarity, structure, and analytical depth of the article.
Reviewers
Shruti, Himanshi Singh and Prisha Sachdeva
Disclaimer
All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organization.
