Gourab Sen
Synopsis
In February 2026, India released two significant documents within two weeks—the first outlined requirements for social media companies to remove specific content. The second introduced PRAHAAR, the nation’s inaugural public counter-terrorism doctrine. Notably, neither document references the other, even though both respond to the same digital threat environment. While PRAHAAR addresses issues such as online radicalisation, encrypted chat applications, and the dark web, its approach is uniform: monitor, identify, and remove. It does not address a critical question: how does extremist content reach individuals who were not actively seeking it?
This article contends that this lack of coordination is intentional rather than accidental. India
has determined that platform architecture falls under the purview of domestic regulation by the
technology ministry, rather than being addressed within its counter-terrorism diplomacy. This has resulted in a clear division of responsibilities. When a neighboring state sponsors an attack, India compiles evidence, presents its case to the United Nations, and often achieves its objectives.
However, in the digital sphere, where domestic extremist cells may form, India enforces content removal more rapidly than most countries yet allows external actors to shape the rules governing platform design. Despite its international credibility—having signed a commitment on algorithms in 2019 and issuing a global declaration on terrorists and technology in 2022—the doctrine does not employ these achievements. It therefore remains separate from newer rules on platform governance.
What PRAHAAR Is?
PRAHAAR — Hindi for ‘strike’ — is the National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) on 23 February 2026 (1). To policymakers and
analysts, India’s first openly published counter-terrorism doctrine runs to roughly nine pages. Its seven pillars give the policy its name: Prevention; Response; Aggregating internal capacities;
Human rights and the rule of law; Attenuating the conditions that allow terrorism to grow;
Aligning international efforts; and Recovery (2). It expands the Multi-Agency Centre and the
Joint Task Force on Intelligence, works through existing laws, and cites a conviction rate above
92%.
While the doctrine’s content is not novel, its consolidation and public release represent an
important development for readers assessing India’s counter-terrorism approach. For a nation that managed counter-terrorism for four decades through disparate laws and customs, this
formalization is noteworthy. International assessments interpret this as a shift toward an
intelligence-led approach. (3)
Why Now? The Timing Question
India had long refrained from formulating a public counter-terrorism doctrine. Consequently, for readers asking why it was published in February 2026, the pertinent question is not what
PRAHAAR articulates, but why it was published then.
The most plausible explanation is that PRAHAAR targets an international audience. Its omissions—no new agency, legislation, budget allocation, or enforcement mechanism—suggest
that a policy intended to transform domestic operations would look different. Instead, it appears
designed to communicate to other governments that terrorism is never justifiable, should not be
linked to any religion, and is sometimes used by regional states as a policy instrument. These
themes suit diplomatic interaction more than law enforcement. Published in English after
Operation Sindoor and during India’s advocacy at the United Nations, PRAHAAR presents India as guided by a coherent doctrine rather than by ad-hoc actions.
This interpretation calls for careful consideration. Domestic pressures were significant, including the Red Fort attack, obligations arising from India’s 2024 financial-crime evaluation, and elevated public expectations following Operation Sindoor. However, these factors explain the demand for a doctrine, not the specific form it ultimately assumed.
Three Days, Two Ministries
On 20 th February 2026, the Information Technology Amendment Rules 2026 came into force, creating a legal category for content made by artificial intelligence, requiring it to be labeled, and cutting the deadline for removing government-flagged unlawful content from 36 hours to three (4). Three days later came PRAHAAR. Two ministries, the same week, the same threat surface, and the same digital ecosystem, yet no mention of each other.
This separation is not a clerical oversight, but rather reflects institutional perspectives. The
individuals who authored PRAHAAR focused on counter-terrorism, whereas the Rules were
crafted by those concerned with platform governance. For the Ministry of Home Affairs, the
internet is a common ground for dangerous actors, and the solution is to identify and remove
dangerous material. In contrast, the technology ministry regards platforms as businesses subject
to regulation, with terrorism categorized alongside issues such as fraud and defamation.
Neither ministry distinguishes between content and platform architecture: while extremist material is visible, the recommendation system delivers it to users. Even the most rapid content removal cannot address the underlying issue of content dissemination mechanisms. Dr Soumya Awasthi of the Observer Research Foundation observes that the policy does not analyze how algorithms amplify extremist content or how the government plans to engage with technology companies (5), pointing to the divide between the two policy tracks.
What Faridabad Showed?
A car bomb exploded near the Red Fort in Delhi on 10 November 2025, leading to 15 deaths over the next week. Investigators uncovered a network of doctors, academics, and a cleric connected to Jaish-e-Mohammed, based at a university in Faridabad. They found nearly 2,900 kg of explosives (6). The bomber, a doctor, made the device using materials he found online.
In this case, there was no training camp, border crossing, or courier to intercept. In contrast, the
Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, which resulted in 26 civilian deaths and prompted Operation
Sindoor, was a cross-border operation—precisely the scenario for which PRAHAAR was
designed and one that India can present to the Security Council with supporting evidence.
For readers focused on digital threats, the Faridabad incident, however, provides no such avenues: there is no group to designate, no financial channel to disrupt. Instead, a network of ideas and instructions traversed borders via commercial platforms, beyond the reach of sanctions or formal designations. India currently lacks diplomatic instruments to address this chain, as it has not articulated rules for the operation of these platforms.
Strong Enforcement, No Position
This does not mean India is weak. Few countries are as strict with platforms as India. WhenXCorp opposed the Sahyog takedown system, the Karnataka High Court supported the systeminSeptember 2025, saying that legal protection for platforms is a conditional statutory privilege, not a right (7). Using just one rule, authorities blocked 28,079 web addresses between 2022 and 2024(8).
However, enforcement alone does not equate to policy leadership. The European Union’s Digital Services Act requires major platforms to assess the risks posed by their recommendation mechanisms and provide independent researchers with data access (9). The United Kingdom’s Online Safety Act centers its requirements on service design rather than solely on visible content (10). Other nations are progressively adopting similar frameworks.
In contrast, India’s regulations focus primarily on identifying and rapidly removing unlawful posts, while PRAHAAR addresses the security threat without extending into platform design. While India robustly enforces content standards, it is still a follower in platform design. In this regard, the formalization of PRAHAAR represents an optimistic step toward realising India’s potential as a rule-maker rather than a rule-follower.
This difference in approach is clear in India’s international commitments. India signed the Christchurch Call in May 2019, which commits its supporters jointly to share information on the effects of algorithmic processes (11), (12), and chaired the United Nations Counter-TerrorismCommittee that produced the Delhi Declaration on terrorists and emerging technologies in 2022(13). Although both commitments remain in effect, till now, they are treated more as symbolic endorsements than as actionable policy tools.
Summary of Findings
• PRAHAAR acknowledges the internet but overlooks its underlying architecture: While it identifies online radicalization, encrypted applications, and the dark web, its response is limited to monitoring and removal. It does not treat platform design as an area of governmental influence, leaving the internet as a location rather than a structural system.
• There is a lack of coordination between ministries, each using distinct terminologies and frameworks: The three-day interval between policy releases indicates a deeper institutional divide: counter-terrorism policy and technology regulations are developed independently, with neither addressing platform design as a security concern.
• The threat has evolved more rapidly than the doctrine: The Faridabad case shows cells formed by professionals using publicly available instructions and commonplace materials, making traditional tools such as designations, sanctions, and evidence files less effective.
• India strictly enforces content rules but does not help set standards for how platforms are designed: While India blocks more content than most countries, it has not yet stated its view on platform architecture, design & governance mechanisms.
Policy Recommendations
• Establish a permanent inter-ministerial working group: Creating a standing body that connects the home, technology, and external affairs ministries, with a mandate to address recommendation systems and cross-border content, would provide tangible evidence that the doctrine functions as a dynamic policy instrument.
• Integrate forecasting functions into the Prevention and Aggregation pillars: India should in corporate computational structures such as Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents (SOMA) within the Multi-Agency Centre and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence. SOM Analyses group behavior and intent based on historical actions, ideology, and resource flows, and has been validated on organizations operating within India (14). The main limitation remains institutional readiness rather than technical feasibility.
• Revitalize the Delhi Declaration (2022): India having authored a global framework onterrorists and technology, should propose follow-up guidance at the Counter-Terrorism Committee on algorithmic amplification, turning the 2022 achievement into an on going policy agenda.
• Prioritize measurement of exposure in addition to compliance: Major platforms should be required to publish routine risk assessments concerning terrorist and violent extremist content. While takedown speed demonstrates compliance, it does not indicate the extent of initial exposure or the mechanisms by which content reached audiences.
• Develop standards that address linguistic diversity: European and UK frameworks provide limited guidance on moderating content across numerous languages with minimal training data. This challenge is routine in India’s context, and establishing such standards could position India as a leader for the Global South.
Looking Ahead
Two developments will indicate future progress: whether the forthcoming Digital India Act incorporates a counter-terrorism component, and whether policy discussions address encrypted messaging and gaming—currently among the least regulated domains. These considerations do not diminish PRAHAAR’s significance. The formal articulation of the doctrine denotes a new phase in India’s strategic method, transforming a fragmented legacy of laws and practices into a logical framework open to debate, measurement, and improvement. The questions identified in this analysis are those that a substantive doctrine should provoke. The effectiveness of PRAHAAR cannot be assessed solely by its text, and it is premature to draw definitive conclusions. Its success will depend on the structures developed beneath it and its capacity to evolving threats.
Endnotes
[1] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 2026. PRAHAAR: National Counter- Terrorism Policy and Strategy. New Delhi, February 23, 2026. Available at: https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/PRAHAAREng_23022026.pdf.
[2] The Federal. 2026. PRAHAAR: What Is the Seven-Pillar Strategy Outlined by the Counter- Terrorism Policy? Available at: https://thefederal.com/category/explainers-2/prahaar-what-is it-mha-counter-terrorism-policy-231327
[3] S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 2026. India’s New PRAHAAR Doctrine and theRegional Terrorism Landscape. Singapore: RSIS, May 8, 2026. Available at: https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/indias-new-prahaar-doctrine-and-the-regional terrorism-landscape/.
[4] Freshfields. 2026. India Targets Deepfakes and AI-Generated Content: Key Changes under MeitY’s 2026 Amendments to the IT Rules. February 20, 2026. Available at: https://www.freshfields.com/en/our-thinking/blogs/technology-quotient/india-targets- deepfakes-and-ai-generated-content-key-changes-under-meitys-2026-102mjwn.
[5] Awasthi, Soumya. 2026. PRAHAAR: India’s New Counter-Terror Policy in a Hybrid Threat Era. Observer Research Foundation, February 26, 2026. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/prahaar-india-s-new-counter-terror-policy-in-a- hybrid-threat-era.
[6] The Statesman. 2025. Red Fort Blast 2025: How an Explosion Unraveled a Larger Plot andWider Terror Network. December 23, 2025. Available at: https://www.thestatesman.com/india/red-fort-blast-2025-investigation-faridabad- 1503529194.html.
[7] Software Freedom Law Center, India. 2025. Analysis of X Corp v Union of India Judgment. October 1, 2025. Available at: https://sflc.in/xcorp-judgment-analysis/.
[8] Business Standard. 2024. Govt Blocks Record 28,000 URLs in 2024; Facebook, XFaceMaximum Takedowns. December 3, 2024. Available at: https://www.business- standard.com/technology/tech-news/govt-blocks-record-28-000-urls-in-2024-facebook-x face-maximum-takedowns-124120300714_1.html
[9] European Union. 2022. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). Of icial Journal of the European Union, October 19, 2022. Availableat: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj.
[10] United Kingdom. 2023. Online Safety Act 2023. London: The Stationery Office. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50.
[11] The Spinoff. 2019. The Christchurch Call: Full Text. The Spinof , May 16, 2019. Available at: https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/16-05-2019/the-christchurch-call-full-text
[12] Pandey, Priyal. 2023. One Year Since the Christchurch Call to Action: A Review. Observer Research Foundation, May 24, 2023. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/one- year-since-the-christchurch-call-to-action-a-review
[13] The Print. 2022. UN Counterterrorism Committee Adopts Delhi Declaration Against Use of Emerging Tech by Terrorists. October 29, 2022. Available at: https://theprint.in/world/un- counterterrorism-committee-adopts-delhi-declaration-against-use-of-emerging-tech-by terrorists/1187151/
[14] Awasthi, Soumya. 2026. From Fusion to Forecasting: Modelling the Adversary through PRAHAAR. Observer Research Foundation, July 25, 2026. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/from-fusion-to-forecasting-modelling-the-adversary through-prehard
Declaration on the Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools
In the interest of research transparency and in keeping with the research ethics requirements of the Diplomacy, Foreign Policy & Geopolitics Youth Fellowship, I hereby disclose the following use of artificial intelligence and software tools in the preparation of this article.
Consensus AI and Google Notebook were used for literature discovery and the preliminary survey of secondary sources. Claude Opus 5 (Anthropic) was used to assist with structuring and organizing the article. Grammarly was used for paraphrasing, grammar, and style correction. Every source cited in the endnotes above was independently retrieved and verified by me against its original publication. The research question, central argument, analysis, findings, and policy recommendations are explicitly of my own, and I accept full responsibility for the content of this article.
About the Contributor
Gourab Sen is an aspiring geopolitical and national security researcher. He holds an M.Sc. in Homeland Security from the National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar, and a B.Tech. in Electrical Engineering from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad University of Technology, West Bengal. He has nearly three years of professional experience with the Adani Group as a Senior Security Officer. His research interests include geopolitics, counter-terrorism, national security, radicalization, foreign policy, OSINT, and emerging technologies.
Disclaimer: All views expressed in the article belong solely to the author and not necessarily to the organisation.
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Acknowledgement:
This article was posted by Tanisha Hooda, a Research and Editorial Intern at IMPRI.
